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A CONTRAST OF TWO MODES OF FICTION AS
CRITIQUES OF THE Ai\lERICAN CULTURAL PATTERN
INTRODUCTION
In dealing with an area of inquiry within which there is
as little consensus of opinion as in that of literary criticism,
it is perhaps wisest for the writer to delineate his perspective
at the outset. This policy is even more advisable in such an
instance as this, when literary criticism is combined with an
exploration into cultural values, and when the perspective set
forth is one which has received little formal discussion, -^t
is hoped that the present inquiry will perhaps mitigate this
condition.
The general perspective from which the present discussion
emerges may be termed, for lack of more definitive reference, as
naturalistic humanism* "^ince both these terms have been used
with such widely differing connotations, certain specific im-
plications involved in their present usage will be set forth:
first, in its present context, the term "naturalistic" implies
an acceptance of the basic scientific postulate of continuity
in nature; second, it means that human activities, drives, pur-
poses, and aspirations are viewed as emerging from the natural
process of man's interpenetration with his environment. I'hat
is, it views man as the product of a cumulative process of in-
terpenetration in which are instituted increasingly complex
relationships among the components of his entire being. It is
maintained that this is the natural process of growth, and is
not restricted to the development of man's physiological nature
tt
Valone. Third, because this perspective assumes continuity in
nature, and man as a part of nature, the only "end" as such,
is the fulfillment of the natural process of growth. Within
this frame of reference, therefore, all human aims, purposes,
and aspirations, all human values and achievements, are to
be judged in the light of their contribution to the develop-
mental process of man.
The meaning of humanism in this context has already been
implied from the foregoing; that is, that all value is realized
only in terms of human experience, there being assumed no supra-
natural order. Secondly, the basis of all value is in the in-
dividual realization of growth and achieved development, -^t
also implies that man's natural process of growth is toward the
achievement of greater humanness and an enlarging sensitivity
to life. For the distinguishing feature between man and the
"lower orders" is in the complexity of his organization, the dev-
elopment of which did not cease with his present stage of physio-
logical development. That simply means that the particular area
of relationships in man which is called his "mind" is also the
product of an evolutionary development. And in its increasing
eomplexity in the cumulative process of experience it offers
more points of contact to life, greater sensitivity in dis-
crimination, more opportunities for varied response patterns,
more areas for growth, etc. ---in short, more humanness. -^^ence,
it is understood that the natural process of experience, aided
by an applied intelligence ( which is itself a product of this
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process) is toward an achieved development of greater human-
ness.
From this it will be seen that the final evaluation of any
area of human activity is guided by the question: "What is its
function, and to what extent does it contribute to a harmonious-
ly achieved development of man, individually and/or collectively?"
That area of activity called art is no exception; hence, the
so-called esthetic values are qualitatively no different from
any other values. Every experience which is complete has an
esthetic quality, and it is only in the degree to which a cer-
tain factor dominates the experience that it is considered in-
tellectual, practical, religious, moral, or what-have you.
Viewed from this perspective, therefore, the major function|
of literature in a cultural context is to clarify the cultural
pattern in which it operates, thereby removing confusions and
constrictions which inhibit the natural developmental process
of the individual. The force fo such functional literature re-
dounds in two ways. For the individual it is a clarification of|
problems of living, sensitizing him to new areas of experience
and new modes of personal adjustment to the exigencies of life,
thus oi'fering him greater opportunity for an achieved cumulative]
development, for society such a clarification of the cultural
pattern is of benefit in that it aids in a progressive reorgan-
ization of the social structure, and furthers the process of a
cooperatively organized applied social intelligence.
Within this context the "importance" of a novel is deter-
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mined by its cultural or social significance; though that may
sound, like a tautology it is not. For the term "significance",
as used within the frame of reference of this paper, has two
specific connotat ions---that of signification, and that of
significance in the popular connotation. The difference be-
tween these meanings is analagous to the difference between a
sign and a symbol. This distinction can be clarified with re-
ference to its discussion by John Dewey
s
Such terms as "meaning", "significance", "value", have
a double sense. Sometimes they mean a functions the
office of one thing representing another, or pointing
to it as implied; the operation, in short, of serving
as a sign. ...But the terms also sometimes m-ean an
inherent quality, a quality intrinsically characterizing
the thing experienced and mailing it worthwhile. ...In
such a pair as "import" and "importance", the first
tends to select the reference to another thing while
the second names an intrinsic content. (l)
It is in the second of these categories of meaning that
the term "significance" will usually be applied in this paper;
however, the first will also be implicit. Vnith respect to the
novels to be considered, in the works of Robert Herrick and
Sinclair Lewis, their significance (in both its meanings) and
value will be determined by the depth and scope of the content
of the relations presented. This view presents two questions
which must be answered: first, "to what area of experience does
the novel point and what are its implications?", i.e., the
novel's significance being interpreted as a sign. And second,
1. Dewey, John, Intelligence in the Modern World, New York:




"How deep in that area of experience does the author penetrate;
what are the meanings, significance, and value of what is pre-
sented?" In this sense the novel is a symbol of a certain con-
text of experience, the depth of the relationships of which,
gives it its "significance" In the popular connotation.
It follows, therefore, that functionally significant lit-
erature does not concern itself with the surface facts of exist-
ence in a culture, the institutions, the customs, folkways, or
even the mores. All of these aspects are superficial in the
sense that they lie near the surface of the cultural pattern of
experience; therefore, if a writer's work is termed superficial
the term will not necessarily imply derogation of his work. It
should be apparent from the foregoing that "functional" critic-
ism is not to be satisfied with the standard questions of tra-
ditional criticism; "What does the author seek to do?", and
"How well does he achieve his purpose?" t^r functional criticisi
is also concerned with whether the author's purpose and results
£ire trivial or important, superficial or significant.
If not concerned with the customs, folkways, mores and
institutions of a cultural pattern, with what then does a
significant novel concern itself? The present fashion is to
consider a novel "significant" if it deals with economic, or
political, or sociological factors from a "progressive" point
of view, i.e., if it has a message. All of these factors m.ay
enter into a consideration of the work, but they never are the





context of the perspective of this paper, the major concern of
literature of social significance is the clarification of the
basic values of a culture, i.e., the acculturative forces which
function within the structure of civilization by institutions,
customs, etc. That is to say, significant literature seeks to
clarify the cultural values for which the framework of civili-
zation has been developed as the best available means of reali-
zation. Those institutions, etc., are never, properly speaking,
ends in themselves although politicians and business men
would have us believe so and in a democratic culture even the
basic values are not ends, but are in process themselves, and
are means toward the furtherance of individual and social deve-
lopment. The difference that such a perspective makes in li-
terarj criticism, is the difference between interpreting In
Dubious Battle and The Grapes of V/rath as novels of labor pro-
blems and the plights of migratory workers, and interpreting
these novels as inquiries into the basic values of life in a
democratic culture. And because the values of democracy are
the best means (to date) of furthering individual growth, that
is, because theY are most conp;ruent to the natural life-process*
such literature is significant not only in terms of its own cul-
tural context, but in terms of the values of life itself. As
John Dewey has said, "Art serves life, not a mode of living".
Such a perspective has particular application to the
writers in question, both of whom are generally considered as
writers of social criticism. It not only serves as an index

for judging the depth of penetration and perception of the wri-
ter, but It also provides a means of testing the validity of his
standard of values used in criticizing what he observes in the
American cultural pattern. This last is especially important;
for if a writer has an immature or specious standard of values,
there can be no cultural criticism in any meaningful sense. He
can ridicule or burlesque, but he cannot really criticize; and
it is non-recognition of this factor which has led to the gross
over-rating of Sinclair Lewis.
Finally, the best and most penetrating social criticism is
that which presents the prospect of unrealized potentialities
of life in contrast to the present actualities. For the writer
"Whose focus is upon the basic values of our culture this has
a special significance, in that the democratic values are orien-
ted toward a greater realization of the potentialities of indivi
dual existence. This has been previously mentioned, and it is
hoped that the following discussion will substantiate this
statement. To know the difference between these two aspects of
a democratic culture, the potentialities and the actualities,
is to know the difference between interpreting the meaninps; of
a culture and merely observing the surface fact
s
of existence
in a culture, '^hls is the contrast between Herrick and Lewis
which the following discussion will seek to present.
There are, therefore, two major problems which this paper
seeks to clarify. The first of these is a clarification of
what constitutes social significance and valid social criticism
r
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in modern fiction. The second is an attempt to formulate an
integrated structure of the major values as accultiirative forces
in a democratic cultur e---the terms "American" and "democratic"
being used interchangeably in the present context. The paper
also seeks, by implication, to clarify the problem of what con-
stitutes functional criticism, and as a part of the same issue,
to expose the limitations of a particulai* form of modern cultism
which seeks to isolate art from life and moral values.
The structure of values which the writer presents as the
core of American democratic culture has been formulated withie
reference to the writings of dominant American thinkers from
Jefferson to Dewey. These writings, it is believed, constitute
the truest expression of the values and ideals of American demo-
cracy, the values which are at the roots of our cultural pat-
tern. In addition, corroborative evidence is offered from the
observations and interpretations of American life from such
prominent Europeans as Grevecoeur and iiiimsterberg, and English-
men, James Bryce, ana Dennis Brogan, as well as others. Finally
the environmental process in which these values developed, have
been realized, or have failed to be realized, is presented with
reference to the writings of such historians as Charles Beard,
Merle Curti, Ralph Gabriel, Howard Beale, and Thor stein Veblen.
Operating throughout this environmental process, and an impli-
cit recognition of the present discussion, are thB two dominant
forces of urbanism and industrialism, forces which are, in
Suzanne K, Danger's words, "the two great threats to mental
1
xii
security." It can be fairly stated that much of Herrick's
writing was an effort to reconcile American values to these
new forces.
...the new mode of living, which has made the old
nature- symbols alien to our minds, and the new mode
of working, which makes personal activity meaningless,
inacceptable to the hungry Imagination .( 1)
Upon formulating the values within a particular area of
American life, the writer will then refer to the novels of
Herrick and Lewis which focus upon this area in order to deter-
mine the degree of penetration and perception of the author's
interpretation. So much for the methods to be utilized.
Final mention should be made of the fact that there will
be no consideration of literary style or the more formal aspects
of literary criticism. Although these aspects are not unim-
portant, they have no place in the present discussion. Con-
sequently, within the present context, it is not to be consider-
ed an inadequacy of an author if he does not meet the modern
reader's demand for subtlety of expression and implied rather
than explicit clarification of cultural values. In large mea-
sure, this is the product of the cumulative development of an
artistic medium and its consideration is not relevant to lit-
erary works which were produced prior to this development.
1. Langer, Susanne, Philosophy in a New Key . New York: Penguin
isooks, 1948, p> 257.
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CHAPTER I
INDIVIDUALISM: THE BASIS OF THE
Ai^lERICAN STRUCTURE OF VALUES
There is much soul-searching and discussion of "values"
in these troubled times, the concern for which was intensified
in the latter part of the nineteenth century, sind hroiight to
a head for thoughtful people when Einstein knocked the props
out of the stable and comfortable Newtonian universe in 1905
and 1910. With the investigations of psychologists, anthro-
pologists, and cultural historians, the concept of relativity
has filtered "down" from the astro-physical universe to the
moral universe of human experience. We now have such para-
doxes as the Anglicized American, T.S. Eliot, pleading for a
return to a medieval world, and the Americanized Englishman,
Whydam Lewis, advocating the "cosmic man" based on an urge for
"root lessness" J somewhere in between lies the area of sanity.
Thirty years ago John Dewey voiced the need for the applica-
tion of the seientific and experimental approach to "social
and moral life". At that time he stated that the "intellectual
task of the twentieth century" was to do for the theory of
value what v
•••the seventeenth century witnessed* • .in astronomy
and general cosmology; the eighteenth century in physics
and general chemistry; the nineteenth century imder-
took in geology and the biological sciences, (l)
1. Dewey, John, Reconstruction in Philosophy
. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1948, p« 75-75>

2If there is any validity in the conclusions of European
interpreters of American life, as well as in the expressions
of prominent American thinkers, it would seem that the basic
values in our culture might hold a special place in a partial
clarification of the present intellectual chaos. That they
have not done so to date is partially due to the fact that suf-
ficient attention has not been given to an integrated formula-
tion of these values.
It will he assumed for the time being (in the expectation
that it will be verified in the process of this paper) that there
is a basic unity in American values irrespective of particular
locale or social or economic class. Consequently, there will
be no division in such terms as rural or urban, sectional or
national, etc. An illustration for the justification of this
view can be seen in Ralph Gabriel *s1he Course of American Demo-
cratic Thou£ht. There, in his excellent chapter, "A Footnote
on John C. Calhoun", he points out how, in the division between
the North and South, each side believed that it was upholding
what Gabriel terms "the American democratic faith". (1) Regard-
less of the "real" causes of the controversy, it was not over
what the opponents at that time held to be the basic American
values, but rather, over the institutional means of achieving
those values. It might be, added parenthetically that this is
a reinforcement of the earlier discussion of the "significance**
(1) Gabriel, Ralph, The Course of American Democratic Thought,
New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1940, p. 103-111.

3Of a work of liter at lare*
In the opinion of the present writer, the basis of the
entire structure of American values is in the conception of
human experience etnhodied in that much ahused and mis-treated
term, individualism. It is unfortunate that the term is in
such disfavor among the present day "progressive" thinkers for
as a result, it has been relinquished without a struggle to
hyper-tbyroidic patriots and the representatives of the National
Association of Manufacturers. But the present reference is not
to that brand which is popularly termed "rugged individualism",
nor to a more recent aberration which might be called "brittle
individualism"; both of these will be considered later within
their proper contexts. (cf» pp. 31-39) For the present we will
concern ourselves with what is most appropriately termed
Emersonian individualism. It is not maintained that this con-
ception was originated by Emerson, for indeed, the origin of
American individualism is recognized to lie in the heritage of
Western Christianity. However, it is also widely acknowledged
that in America this conception has acquired certain character-
istics which distinguish it form European thought. It is in
this development that the foundation has been laid for our sub-
sidiary values of social, intellectual and vocational demo-
cracy, etc.
The core of this conception is the focus upon the individual
as a harmoniously integrated being who achieves development in
a continuous and cumulative process of int erpenetration with
f
his environment. Emerson expressed the first part of this when
he stated that
•••truly it demands something godlike in him who has cast
off the common motives of hximanity, and has ventured to
|
trust himself for a taskmaster^ Hi^h be his heart • faith- jl
ful his will s clear his sight s that he may in good earnest 1
he doctrine, society, law, to himself, that a simple
purpose may be to him as iron necessity is to others • (1)
(Italics mine.)
And in the same essay, he states that
Life only avails, not the having lived. Power ceases in
the Instant of repose; it resides in the moment of tran-
sition from a past to a new state, in the shooting of the
gulf, in the darting to an aim. (2)
This is neither mysticism nor transcendentalism, but the core
of modem experiential philosophy.
Few people, whether they agree with Dewey or not, will
contend that he is not the leading exponent of modern exper-
iential philosophy; and with regard to the same aspect of human
j
experience as expressed above, he virtually paraphrases EmersonJ,
I
i'he world is full of things that are indifferent and even
hostile to life; the very processes by which life is main-
i
tained tend to throw it out of gear with its surroundings.
-Nevertheless , if life continues and if in continuing it
expands , there is an overcoming of factors of opposition
and conflict ; there is a transformation of them into
differentiated aspects of a higher pov/ered and more sig-
nificant lif e . • .Plere in germ are balance and harmony
attained through rhythm. Equilibrium comes about not
mechanically and inertly but out of, and because of,
tensioriT TST ( Italics mine
.
)
(1) -^nerson, Ralph W., Essays . New York: Literary Classics,
1945, p. 54.
(2) Ibid , p. 50.
(3) Dewey John, Art as Experience . New York: Minton, Balch &
*^ompany, 1954, p. 14.
r
5Though not expressed in "experiential" or philosophic
terminology, there can be little doubt that Jefferson had in
mind a similar conception of individualism when he made it the
basis of the "natural rights" of man. In this respect it is
perhaps illuminating to refer to a letter he wrote to Monroe:
If we are made in some degree for others, yet, in a greater
are we made for ourselves. It were contrary to feeling,
and indeed ridiculous to suppose that a man had less
rights in himself than one of his neighbors, or indeed
all of them put together, (l)
But to return to individualism as a conception of human
experience and basis for value, Robert Herrick is no less ar-
ticulate in this respect than Emerson or Dewey. This concep-
tion does, in fact, provide the core of his philosophic perspec-
tive, i.e., that the meaning of life lies in the individual reali-
zation of values. His focus as a social critic, is upon the
limitations of our cultural pattern which prohibit the indivi-
dual from fulfilling the potentialities of life which are in-
herent in the developmental process of the basic American
values. The process by which this takes place, i.e., the pro-
cess of realization, will be considered in detail later (cf
.
pp. 113-125) but for the present it is sufficient to state in
terms of the present frame-work, that in the fulfillment of the
^erican values, the way is opened for the individual to achievei
that inner "equilibrium" and expansion of life mentioned by
(1) Jefferson, Thomas, Thomas Jefferson on Democracy
.
New York:
Penguin Books, Inc., 1939, p. 14.
r
6Dewey. It should be mentioned that this does not conflict
with Emerson's statement that "power ceases in the Instant
of repose"; rather the quotations from Dewey and Emerson com-
plement one another* ^'or in this conception of individualism
the process of achievement consists of a rhythmic development
from one level of equilihriiam of "high. • .heart , faithful.
will, clear .sight" to a "higher powered and more significant"
level, achieved in the "shooting of the gulf" and darting to a
new aim.
That this perspective is shared by Herrick is illustrated
in a quotation on the frontispiece of Chimes » a novel dealing
with higher education. In this passage he states that
...life is, after all, nothing but the capacity to assert
a condition of inner equilibrium within the transition
of external circumstances, (l)
And in Together , where he is primarily concerned with clari-
fying the meaning of marital relations and the role of the
American woman, "it seemed that life was life. ..a wonderful
journey of "enlarging mystery from experience to experience
into some great ocean of understanding". (2) Agfiiin, when two
of the characters had finally achieved a clarified and inte-
grated understanding of their relationship:
Thus at the extreme verge of human experience these two
realized that inner state of harmony that equilibrium of
spirit, towards which conscious beings strive.. .and
(1)Herrick, Robert, Chimes
.
New York: The ^acMillan Co., 1926,
p. frontispiece.




7which sanctioning what man forbids gives reason to life.(l)
It is this conception of individualism which is Herrick's
departure point, the individual right to an untrammeled ex-
pression of an intelligent, integrated, and harmoniously active
self a self which is oriented toward an achieved development
through the realization of those values which are most appro-
priate to its inherent potentialities.
The problem of interpreting Lewis's conception of individ-
ualism presents certain difficulties which are inherent in his
philosophic perspective. These difficulties also apply to any
consideration of his treatment of the American values which are
achieved in the relation to what has been termed Emersonian in-
dividualism; and it is this factor which is responsible for the
previously mentioned superficiality of his writing, ^t before
offering a consideration of this it would perhaps be best for
the writer to inject a brief comment with regard to what com-
prises an adequate presentation of or inquiry into American
values, as Judged by the frame of reference previously set
forth.
In his occasionally penetrating and perspicacious study
of American values entitled The Americans « Hugo Hunsterberg
stated his purpose "of finding the deeper impulses in American
life". In explanation of his conclusions he remarked that,
(1) Ibid, p. 330.
c
8The grumbler in pu"fi)lic life sees in such a view of the
American, of course, merely a fancy picture of an
imaginary creature; he is not aware that every portrayal
involves abstraction, and that a study in Americanism
means, indeed, a study of the Americans as the best of
them are, and as the others should wish to be. (1) (Italics
mine •!
This seems to the present writer a very simple but adequate
index and it will be implied in any further discussion of the
subject of this paper. Therefore, when such abstract concep-
tions as social democracy, freedom of conscience, faith in free
public education, etc. are considered, it is to be recog-
nized that they are viewed in this light. That is, they are
valued by those Americans with an integrated and clarified under-
standing of American life as ideals to be eventually achieved
in experience, and applied in ever increasing completeness to
the entire population. With regard to their treatment in
literature the reader must in some manner be stimulated to
achieve his own comprehension of them. This can, of course, be
accomplished in several ways. It can be done through symboli-
zing the values in an affirmative approach to the subject-matter
with varying degrees of subtleness, ranging from Herrick^s
idyllic treatment in The Master of the Inn, to John Steinbeck's
exquisit and subtle parable. The Pearl.
The same end of communication can be achieved through a
**negative" approach to the subject-matter, in focusing upon the
limitations of the cultural pattern and the distorted manifesta-
(l) Munsterberg, Hugo, The Americans, New York: McClure,
Phillips & Co., 1905, p. ix«
e
9tions which emerge from positive values, '^'his is, of course,
largely the approach taken by Lewis. However, a necessary as-
pect of this approach is that the author must in some msinner
imply the significance of these values and his own understand-
ing of them; this Mr. Lewis, seldom, if ever, does»
A third approach exists, as would naturally be assumed, in
the combination of the other two; and this is the method largely|
used by Herrick, If one accepts the frame of reference set
forth in the Introduction of this paper, it follows that if a
writer fails to convey his own understanding of these values,
and thereby falls in stimulating a perception of them on the
part of the reader, he fails as a serious and authentic artist.
If he has no seriousness, but is, in reality, merely perpetrating
a literary hoax, he is violating his responsibility to his
audience and lacks artistic integrity. And if it is not an
authentic presentation, that is, if it does not present a suf-
ficiently clarified understanding, then the writer has not pene-
trated deeply enough to be considered an artist. Which brings
us back to Iiir. Lewis and his conception of individualism.
If one wished to sacrifice clarity for brevity he could
dispense ?;ith the discussion by stating that Lewis has no con-
ception of individualism as it has been presented-—or at least
it does not appear in his works. This is the necessary result
of his denial of the role of intelligence, -^'or individualism
is merely the name for the value achieved through free expres-
sion of an intellectually clarified and integrated self, in the
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developmental process of realizing ideals perceived by intelli-
gence, Mr. Lewis denies this implicity in the total drift of his
stories, as well as explicity in such. statement s as that of
Paul Riesling in Babbitts
Good lord, I don't know what "rights" a_man hasl And
I don't know the solution of boredom* if I did, I'd
be the one philosopher that had the cure for living.
But I do knov/ that ten times as many people find their
lives dull, and unnecessarily dull, as ever admit it;
and I do believe that _if we busted out and admitted it
sometimes, instead of being nice and patient and loyal
for sixty years, and then nice and patient and dead for
the rest of eternity, w^y maybe , possibly , we might makec
. ,
life more fun. (l) (Italics mine)
It is important to note at this point that Paul Riesling,
the sensitive, potentially great violinist, who took over his
father's roofing paper business and later shot his wife, is one
of the few of Mr* Lewis's characters whom he does not intention-
ally burlesque. This aspect is of special significance in inter
preting the implied meaning of Babbitt , in that Paul Riesling
represents Lewis's conception of the repression of individual
potentialities by the limitations of the cultural pattern. It
is, therefore, intended as an indictment of the American pattern
of experience. But because Riesling rejects the role of intelll
gence as a means of clarifying life's problems he cannot be
considered representative of the American quality of experience
and expecially that quality characteristic of a sensitive and
Intellectual artist. In "busting out and admitting" boredom,
(1) Lewis, Sinclaire, Babbitt , ^"^ew York: Harcourt, Brace &
Co., 1922, p. 65.
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the individual makes intelligence the sjave of emotion and im-
|>ulse, rather than the clarifier; and in doing this he ab-
stracts the most important quality from human experience. In
a like manner, to "make life more fun" is not the primary value
of an adult intelligent human being, but rather, that of an
immature hedonist. Hence, one is inclined to wonder about the
potentialities of Paul Riesling in the first place, and second-
ly, because he rejects the role of the most human factor in
experience, his example is not an adequate index of the limi-
tations of American culture.
As would be expected. Babbitt is as equally at a loss to
know life*s meaning as Paul, as when Lewis presents him in one
of those rare moments of soul-searching:
V»hat did he want? Wealth? Social position? Travel?
Servants? Yes, but only incidentally.
"I give it up", he sighed.
But he did know that he wanted the presence of Paul
Riesling; and from that he stumbled into the admission
that he wanted the fairy girl— in the flesh. ••
He thought of the prettiest of the manicure girls at the
Hotel Thornleigh barber shop, (l)
It cannot be ssifely argued either that this is merely an
aspect of Lewis's early writing, or that this was the view
of a "negativistic" approach, ^'or there is the same evidence of
his ultimate rejection of the role of intelligence in rt Can*t
Happen Here, one of the few novels where he seems to be serious-
ly concerned with the affirmation of certain historic values.
(1) Ibid, p. 273
C'
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Even here there is the same general drift of purposelessness,
the same rejection of intelligence and the same presentation
of the individual as completely and irrevocably conditioned by
his environment. However, that is question-begging of the issue
set before us, and in order to validate this discussion it is
necessary to refer to explicit illustrations, of which there
are ample*
In discussing the "brilliant" campaign techjiique of the
dictator. Buzz Windrip, Mr. Lewis states, _ln propria persona ^
not through the medium of one of his characters, that
Buzz might not have learned, perhaps could not have learned,
much from so ciolo^ist s Charles Beard and John Dewey, but
they could have learned a great deal from Buzz" Cl) (Italics
mine.l
It should be apparent that the above is an implied rejection
of the validity of achieved understanding as the product of
specialized intelligence—-which is, in essence, a rejection
of the very basis of the values which Mr. Lewis attempts to
affirm in this book. In short, it puts "good ole shrewd horse
sense" above the level attained by a life-time application of
the highest natural endowment of intellect to the basic pro-
blems of human experience. This perverted attitude of anti-
intellectualism pervades Mr. Lewis's entire work and reappears
again in the thoughts of Doremus Jessup, the liberal editor
of a small-town newspaper:
(l) Lewis, Sinclair, ^t Can 't Happen Here , Garden ^ity, Yorks
Doubleday,"noran & Co., 1955, p. 93.
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"Is it just possible", he sighed, "that the most vigorous
and boldest idealists have been the worst enemies of human
progress instead of its greatest creators? Possible that
plain men with the humble trait of minding their own
business will rank higher in the heavenly hierarchy than
all the plumed souls who have shoved their way in among
the masses and insisted on saving them?" (l) (Italics mine)
Be it noted also that Doremus Jessup is another of the
few characters for whom Lewis maintains a respectful consider-
ation; and it is Jessup who carries the burden of all the
"philosophizing" on democratic values in this book. It can,
therefore, be taken that this is a further reflection of Lewises
adherence to the cult of the "common sense of the average guy"*
It incidentally reveals his complete ignorance of the historic
role of AiT.erican practical idealism as well as the role of indi-
vidual American statesmen and leaders of the people. 'Ihis
latter aspect was explicitly noted by James Bryce in The Ameri-
can Commonv;ealth when he stated that
In some countries men of brilliant gifts may be dangerous
to freedom; but the ambition of American statesmen has
been schooled to flow in constitutional channels, and the
Republic is strong enough to stand any strain to which the
rise of heroes may expose her* (2)
^o much for the role of intelligence in individualism.
This has been considered in detail because it is held in the
opinion of the writer that Mr. Lewis's devaluation of intelli-
gence, and his own inability to perceive the role of intelligence,
are factors responsible for virtually all his subsequent limi-
(1) Ibid, p. 141.
.(2) ^ommager, Henry Steele, America in Perspective, The New
American Library, 1947, p. 150,
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tat ions as a social critic-— as the term has been developed in
this paper.
The most immediate and direct results of this primary limi-
tation can be separated in terms of their respective bearing
upon his philosophic and artistic perspective. With regard to
the former the problem comes back to the original inquiry into
his ocnception of individualism, and all the subsequent values
which derive from it. Adequate illustrations have been given
to show that Lewis does not conceive of an intelligent consid-
eration of life-aims on the part of the individual, nor of the
functional application of intelligence to the clarification of
life*s problems and the achievement of realized values. And
in the final analysis, it is only through the application of
intelligence that one achieves an integrated and harmoniously
active self, thereby establishing continuity of self in the
process of experience. This view is clarified by John Dewey in
his discussion of the harmonization of the self through the
application of intelligence in the control of such elements
as desire, impulse and emotions:
Impulse is primary and intelligence is secondary and in
some sense der ivat ive. . .But recognition of it as a fact
exalts intelligence. For thought is not the slave of im-
pulse to do its bidding. . .Wkat intelligence has to do in
the service of impulse is to act not as its obedient ser-
vant but as its clarifier and liber at or .. .by a study of
the conditions and causes, the workings and consequences
of the greatest possible variety of desires and combina-
tions of desire. (1)
(l) Dewey, John, Human Nature and 'Conduct a ^"^ew York: Random
Bouse, Inc., 1939, p. 254-255«
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On the basis of the above quotation, and in light of the
previous discussion of Lewis, it necessarily follows that he
could not have a conception of human experience as it has pre-
viously been set forth. And insofar as the acculturative forces
of the American value structure have any meaning at all it is
only in their interaction with the individual, '-^his will be-
come more apparent as Lewis's "interpretation" of them is con-
sidered*
There is yet another aspect of Lewis's general perspective,
however, which is perhaps a greater limitation than his con-
ception of human experience. And, like his lack of recognition
of intelligence and the individuat ive process, this aspect also
militates against the presence of social significance or social
criticism in his works, ^'his is with reference to his present-
ation of American culture in terms of snap-shots of the surface
conditions and situations of life, rather than presenting a view
of American culture in process. For any presentation of culture
as a static condition is not only a distortion, but an outright
falsification of reality.
There is little questioning of the consensus that serious
fiction attempts in some fashion to present the artist's per-
ception of reality, experience, nature, or the like. V/hen that
perception fails to elicit what might be called the "processive"
character of reality, then it fails utterly in comprehending
the nature of reality; for as Alfred North Whitehead has said:
"The reality is the process." The process involved is once
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again in Professor V/hitehead ' s terms, the process of prehensive
unification; that is, a process of occasions of unification in
nature equivalent to what is t ermed apprehension in mental
activity:
This unity of a prehension defines itself as a here and
a now, and the things so gathered into the grasped unity
have essential reference to other places and other times.
•••Perception is simply the cognition of prehensive uni-
fication; or more shortly, perception is cognition of
prehension^ . •Accordingly , nature is a process of expansive
development, necessarily transitional from prehension to
prehension^ What is achieved is thereby passed beyond,
but it is also retained as having aspects of itself pre-
sent to prehensions which lie beyond it
•
Thus nature is a structure of evolving processes. The
reality is the process.^. • (l)
When the rather specialized terminology of Professor White-
head is translated into one more readily understandable, this
means simply that nature is a cumulative and evolving process
of unified space-tine relationships among "things" • Therefore,
any writer who has pretensions toward a "realistic" portrayal
of life in general, or of a particular cultural pattern, must
communicate a perception of this evolving structure of relation-l
ships—-not a photograph of disconnected and unrelated events
or situations. This rules out the "slice of life school" of
realism as presenting in authentic perception of reality, as it
does the determinists who find all culture resulting from
**single force", ^'or culture is not a result, but an evolving
process of interacting relationships in which all areas of
(l) V/hitehead, Alfred North, Science and the Modern World,
Nev. York: The New American Library , C 1925 Jp. 71-74.
f
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value are operative and from which no one area can be separated
from its context. Accordingly, it is only on the basis of a
realization of this factor that a writer can validly maintain
pretensions to social criticism or the creation of socially
significant novels.
Also, if the primary assumption of this paper is granted, I
i.e., the assumption of continuity in nature, this principle
must apply also to the interpretation of human nature, "^hls
means, a portrayal of human experience as the cumulative dev-
elopmental and integrative process of the self previously dis-
cussed, (cf. pp. 3-6) In short, characterization is valid only
when it presents the vital quality of integrated human exper-
ience, a thing which cannot be done on the basis of stereotyped
or composite characters, (cf. pp. 19-21)
Vi/ith relation to Lewis 's perception of the "process of
prehensive unification", i.e., his interpretation of the process
of American culture, it is interesting to note the reaction and
evolution of American literary critics. In several instances
they noted the previously implied limitations of Lewis's writing
but failed to follow this through in their evaluation of his
work. J. Donald Adams has referred to him as "the greatest
photographer in fiction that we have produced", (l)( Italics mine
while -tienry Seidel Canby stated that he was better "at carica-




though, Harrington provides an illustration of the inability of
American critics (and European as well, if one considers the
Nobel committee as "critics") to evaluate Mr. Lewis adequately.
For as it so frequently happened when he dealt with individual
authors and especially modern ones. Parrington, the very per-
ceptive "trend" interpreter, had occ asional flashes of insight
which he failed to follow through to their conclusions. Con-
sequently, in referring to "our own Diogenes" he spoke of
Lewis's irrepressible satire(l) and stated that Lewis's picture
of AmericaJi life "is extra-ordinarily lif elike" . (2 ) That, of
course, depends upon how deep into the conditions of and the
relations in life one wished to go. He refers to Mr. Lewis as
asking "what this rumbling herd signifies in the light of ratiorl
al and humane ideals." (S) And he states that "no field of Ameri
can experience has escaped his minute invest igat ion" (4) , which
is a very true and accurate characterization of Mr* Lewis's
activity-— an activity much closer to that of the news reporter
than the artist. And again, Farrington refers to Lewis's "in-
dictment of middle-class ideals"(5). All of these statements
would seem to indicate an unqualified approval of Lewis's
writing, and yet Parrington was certainly not an insensitive
reader, as is indicated when he stated that
1. Ibid, p. 361.
2. Ibid
, p. 362.
3. Ibid, p. 368.





These brisk pages are filled with the doings of auto-
mata not living men hut the simulacra of men, done
with astonishing verisimilitude, speaking an amazingly
realistic language, professing a surprising life-
likeness; yet nevertheless only shells from which the
life has departed, without faith or hope or creative
energy, not even aware that they are dead.(l)
The truly amazing thing is that after recognizing in the
above quotation Mr, Lewis's long list of sins of omission and
commission, Parrington proceeds to j ustify them on the "basis
that "the rich nourishment provided by the great age of the
Enlightenment" had been "slowly dissipated by an encompassing
materialism". (2) ^nd with this dissipation went faith in all
the ideals handed on by the Enlightenment
;
And now we have fallen so low that our faith in justice,
progress, the potentialities of human nature, the excel-
lence of democracy, is stricken with pernicious anemia,
and even faith in the machine is dying. (3)
The mortality rate among the prophecies of the calamity
howlers is notoriously high, and it is to be recalled that the
above was written just six years before the institution of the
New Deal. Regardless of one's opinion of its merits and de-
merits, it can hardly be denied that it was carried on with
considerable popular enthusiasm and faith in its efficacy.
Perhaps Mp, Parrington was too close for an adequate per-
spective, or perhaps he shared somewhat the same error as i'lr.
Lewis, in his confusion of the basic values and acculturative
forces of the culture with some of the aberrant manifestations
1. Ibid, p, 368.
2. Ibid
, p. 369.
3. Loc . cit.
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developed in the efforts to realize those values, -^'his does
not mean at all that we can afford to deal lightly with cultural
aberrations which masquerade as these values fulfilled, but
neither can we sifford to take such a short-sighted view as Mr*.
Parrington did, for as Whitehead quite aptly put it, "Error
is the penalty we pay for progress"
.
Having dealt with the "opinions of the critics" we can now
return to Mr. Lewis and judge the validity of these opinions.
One of the first elements which becomes apparent in his method
of characterization is that of the use of labels to identify his
characters. In this sense the nsLnes have no symbolic value,
but rather, are used as signs; that is, they are applied speci-
ficially to evoke a signal reaction, which is a technique of
burlesque and vaudeville, net "irrepressible satire" or social
criticism. Typical of this method is his introduction in
Babbitt of
Vergil Gunch, the coal-dealer, Sidney Finkelstein, the
ladies '-ready-to-wear buyer for Parocher and Stein's
department store, ana Professor Joseph K. Pumphrey,
owner of the Riteway Business College and instructor
in Public Speaking, Business English, Scenario Writing,
and Commercial Law»(l)
And in Arrowsmith the reader is introduced to the public
health officer of Zenith, the exuberant and loquacious Dr.
Alraus Pickerbaugh, and his eight boimcing daughters, "Orchid,
Verbena, Daisy, Jonquil, Hibisca, Narcissa, and the twins,
1. Lewis, Sinclair, Op .Cit . p. 55.
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Arbuta and Gladiola."(l) Somehow one can't help questioning
whether or not there is any "surprising life-likeness". Later,
one learns to know Dr. Rippleton Holabird, the overly suave
and delicately cultivated official of the McGurk Institute.
The other major aspect of Lewis's method of characteriza-
tion is in his description of the characters themsell/es. They
never define themselves by their actions, which of course, they
could not do on the basis of the author's conception of human
experience. Gonsquently, he goes into considerable detail in
presenting each new character of any importance. Ana as Henry
Seidel Canby stated, he is much better "at caricature than at
character". There are, in fact, no characters as such in any
of his novels, but rather, they are composite straw men of all
the worst traits drawn from a particular profession or class-
ification of individuals, '•'•'hus it is that Elmer Gantry has all
the worst characteristics of the leaders of every fraudulent
evangelical cult of the time he lies, steals, cheats, wenches J
drinks, is bigoted and hypocritical at the same time, and combii^es
the platform techniques of Billy Sunday, Aimee Semple I«5ac-
Pherson, and all the other leaders of the saw-dust circuit.
Such a composite also is Mrs. George F, Babbitt, whose only
spark of life in the book is developed in her fear of death
during an emergency appendectomy. Myra Babbitt, composite
portrayal of all the harmless, but annoying minor vices which
!• Lewis, Sinclair, Arrowsmith . New York; Random House, Inc.,
(cpr. by Harcourt. Brace cc Co., inc., 1925) p. 209.
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supposedly afflict the mythical middle-class matron!
She had creases from the corners of her mouth to the
bottom of her chin, and her plump neck bagged* But
the thing that marked her as having passed the line
was that she no longer had reticences before her hus-
band, and no longer worried about not having reticences.
She was in a petticoat now, and corsets which bulged,
and unaware of being seen in bulgy corsets. She had
become so dully habituated to married life that in her
full matronliness she was as sexless as an anemic nun.
She was a good woman, a kind woman, a diligent woman,
but no one, save perhaps Tinka her ten-year-old, was
at all interested in her or entirely aware that she
was alive. (l)
This method is not applied alone to those whom Lewis
v;ishes to ridicule or burlesque. On the contrary, it is utili-
zed also in relation to the characters who have ivlr. Lewis's
sympathy; indeed, it is with one exception the only method he
has. Its limitations are more apparent also when he develops
a "favorable" character, because we are still inclined some-
what to have a certain affinity toward any indictment of the
above aspects of the middle-class, no matter how superficial
or distorted. A good illustration of his utilization of this
method in a "sympathetic" portrayal is to be seen in his deve-
lopment of the strong and silent James Buck Titus in It Can't
Happen Here:
Janes Buck Titus, who was fifty but looked thirty-
eight, straight, broad-shouldered, slim-waist ed,
long-must ached, swarthy—-Buck v>/as the Dan ' 1 Boone
type of Old American, or, perhaps, an Indian-fighting
calvary captain, out of CharlesIII. • .His father, a




richish railroad contractor, had left him the great
farm near West Beulah and Buck had come back home to
grow apples, to breed Morgan stallions, and to read
Voltaire, Anatole France, Nietzsche, and Dostoyef sky . (l)
Certainly, the authors of the historical romances with the
lusty jackets have never done better.
Ignoring the fact that such characterizations are not symp-
tomatic of the "prehensive unification" of human experience
within the culutral pattern, and the fact that Lev/ is has no con-
ception of individuated human experience his plot structure is
contrived and manipulated rather than being organically develo-
ped by the relations among the characters-— ignoring these
aspects as legitimate points for criticism, the focus will be
up<in that which prevents him from going beneath the surface of
the American pattern itself. This has been previously mentioned,
with regard to his conception of individualism, and it is now
time to take up this aspect in relation to Herrick also and ex-
tend the inquiry into the rest of the structure of values.
There are two main aspects of Lewis's work which militate
against his penetrating to the meaning and significance of Ameri-
can culture both of which have been implied in the entire
discussion thus far. The first is what might be termed a denial
of value considerations by the logic of his philosophic perspec -
tive^ For, if in his conception of human experience he had
denied the clarifying and controlling factor of intelligence,
1. Lewis, Sinclair^ Pt Can ' t Happen Here , Garden City, New





as he seems to have done, then he has denied the possibility of
evaluative behavior. This in turn, leads to the practical
denial of values, for they cannot be perceived and discriminatec,
except through evaluative behavior, and they cannot be realized
except through the application of intelligence.
The other prohibition is in the logic of his method , or
artistic perspective . Insofar as he rejects the role of in-
telligence he is satisfied with the surface manifestations of
1
human existence and is not impelled to penetrate to the relatior
in human experience that give meaning and value and which are
clarified and interpreted by intelligence. Consequently, his
artistic focus is upon "facts", purely sensory elements in
experience, i'his has already been seen in his detailed descri-
ption about characters (one never has a qualitative conception
of character in his works), and it is also illustrated in his
elaborately detailed descriptions of places, buildings, towns,
etc. One of the most memorable of the latter is the tedious
passage in Main Street, after Carol had "walked thirty-two
minutes" and then "stood at the corner of Main Street and
Washington Avenue and despaired" .( 1
)
It has been submitted in this chapter that the foundation
of the democratic structtiire of values is in the conception of
the individual as the product of a continuous cumulative
1 Lewis, Sinclair, iviain Street, New York: Harcourt^ Brace






and integrative process of experience. In this process, the
function of intelligence plays a vital part in perceiving life
aims, interpreting relationships in experience, and aiding the
process of self-realization. Concerning all these aspects the
authors under consideration have presented a consistent contrast
It is now time to inquire into the areas of value which in a
sense emerge from this conception of individuated experience, an
which operate as acculturat ive forces in interaction with the
individual. The validity of the social criticism of the re-
spective authors will receive further clarification in the






FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE Al^lD INTELLECTUAL DEfAOCRACY
Of secondary importance only to the basic principle of in-
dividualism in the American value system, is that area of values
emerging from freedom of conscience. In her discussion of the
symbolic processes in mental activity Susanne K, Langer states:
• • fjiterference with acts that have ritual value (con-
scious or unconscious) is always felt as the most intoler-
ableinjury one man, or group of men, can do to another.
Freedom of conscience is the basis of all personal
freedom.. .No matter how fantasjyic may be the dogmas
he holds sacred, how much his living rites conflict with
the will or convenience of society, it is never a light
matter to demand their violation. . .Common insult strikes
at one^s ego: but constraint of conscience strikes at
one's ego and super-ego, one's whole world, humanity,
and purpose, (l)
Jefferson recognized the paramount importance of this free-
dom when he wrote to Edward Dowse in 1803, stating that
"we are bound, you, I, and every one, to make common
cause, even with error itself, to maintain the comwion
right of freedom of conscience..." (2)
And as Beard points out, the concern for freedom of conscience
was due in large measure to the fact that "the immense major-
ity of the colonists belonged to dissenting and non-ccnformist
-
denominations." (3)
From this belief in freedom of conscience, one can discern
the emergence of three interacting and integrating areas of
(1) Langer, Susanne K., Philosophy in a New Key , New York:
Penguin Books Inc., 1948, p. 236-237.
(2) Jefferson, Thomas, Jefferson's Letters , Eau Claire, Wis:
E.M. Hale & Co., p. 115.
(3) Beard, Charles A. & Mary R., Basic History of the United
States
.
New York! The i^ew Home Library, 1944, p. 58.
(
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value—-tolerance, respect for the individual, and intellectual
democracy* Although tolerance and respect for the individual
merge with other areas of value also, for the present they will
be discussed only in relation to intellectual democracy* Inas-
much as the foundation of these ideals lies in freedom of con-
cience, which is largely "based upon the sanctity of the processes
of symbolization as presented by Mrs. Langer, the present dis-
cussion will concern itself with tolerance of ideas and respect
for the individual as a manifestation of personality.
•^he conception of tolerance is so closely related to that
of freedom of conscience during the early history of the country
that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish them. Perhaps the
ibest way is to consider the realization of tolerance as an overt
imanifestation of a belief in the value of freedom of conscience.
In this respect certain observations by Crevecoeur are illumi-
nating, as when he wrote that
If any new sect springs up in Europe, it may happen that
many of its professors will come and settle in America.
As they bring their zeal with them, they are at liberty
to make proselytes if they can, and to build a meeting
house and to follow the dictates of their conscience; for
neither the government nor any other power interferes • (l)
It would seem that tolerance first emerged as a consciously
Iformulated conception to be applied to religious scruples only,
being advanced to other areas of thought and activity in the
process of its practical application, '-^'his is perhaps illus-
(1) Commager, Henry Steele, America in Perspective * The New
American Library, 1947, p. 26.
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trated by the fact that "Notes on Religion", which Jefferson
wrote in 1776, began with the question: "How far does the duty
of toleration extend?" (l) It is interesting to note that to
Jefferson it was a duty by this time, and not merely a moral
expediency used to harmonize the existence of a number of mu-
tiually exclusive religious sscts. In answering his own question
Jefferson extends the "duty of toleration" without limits or
reservat ions s
I'he care of every man's soul belongs to himself. But
what if he neglect the care of it? Vifell what if he
neglect the care of his health or estate, which more
nearly relate to the state? V/ill the magistrate malie a
law that he shall not be poor or sick? (2)
'^he process by v/hich the conception of tolerance spread
from an exclusive concern for the inviolability of one's reli-
gious beliefs to the broader conception of intellectual toler-
ance in general does not seem to have had much attention from
most historians. However, it would be safe to assume that as
the idea became firmly implanted it was extended to the more
secular beliefs peculiar to the various religious sects the
celibacy of the Shakers, non-mechanization of the Mennonites,
0tc» It is apparent, however, in the persecution of the Mormons
that the people of the country as a whole were not willing to
extend the principle all the way as was Jefferson, especially
when it contravened their basic conception of morality. This
(1) Jefferson, Thomas, Thomas Jeffarson on Democracy a ^"^ew ^orks
Penguin Books, Inc. (1939), p. 109.
(2) Ibid, p. 109.
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basic conflict in the practical manifestation of two aspects of
the same standard, of values was remarked upon by Francis Grund
in The Americans in Their Morale Social and Political Relations .
(1837), in which he stated:
The least solecism in the moral conduct of a man is
attributed to his want of religion, and is visited upon
him as such, -'-t is not the offense itself, but the out-
rage on society, which is punished, (l)
Because Robert Herrick's conception of tolerance is usually
embodied dramatically in the relationships between his characters,
it is not easily illustrated. In this respect, however, it is
important to note that the significance and value of this con-
ception for Herrick was always to be measured in terms of the
individual. In the one novel ( of the group selected for this
paper) in which he gives explicit consideration to the problem,
there is a special symbolic significance attached to the person
who is the militant defender of tolerance. This occurs in
Chimes in that section of the book dealing with the college
campus activities during and shortly after the first World war,
a period of hysteria uncomfortably similar to the present one.
It is Beckwith, the English professor, and perennial champion
of the oppressed, Y;ho assumes the role of protector of the con-
scientious objectors among the students, and the "stray Hindus,
who had escaped from India and were being pursued by the Brit-
ish secret service". (2) The symbolic significance mentioned
Gommager, H©nry Steele, Op . c it
.
, p. 71.




is in the integrated relationships among the values which are
maintained in Tjractical application by him: he is one of the
two men who figure prominently in the formulation of a philoso-
phy of education related to an integrated development of the
individual (cf. pp. 43-46, 70-71); he is the symbol of the
author's conception of professional integrity and vocational
democracy in that he exemplifies an achieved excellence in
j
imderstanding with a consequent responsibility to clarify
social problems within his area of excellence this in sup-
port of a worker's college and the union movement; he is, in
short, an American radical and the Emersonian ideal of the
American Scholar, the terms being synonymous in this context.
He is not an exempler of Lewis's oonception of the radical pro-
fessor which "every university faculty must have",
A Wild Man to provide thrills and to shock crowded
lecture-rooms, one who was permitted, without restriction!^
to speak of himself as immoral, agnostic and socialistic,
so long as it was universally known that he remained
pure Presbyterian, and Republican. (l)
finally, Beckwith is an integrated individual in the Emer-
sonian sense, for
He had given himself prodigally all the years of his
life to every suggestion that promised to enlarge
experience or open men's minds, or soften their pre-
judices. His prodigality had kept him as fresh and
youthful as Jessica's refusals. (2)
Although not entirely appropriate at this point it is not
Xl) Lewis, Sinclair, Arrowsmith , New York: Random House, Inc.,
(1925), p. 10-11.
(2) Herrick, Robert. Op. cit. . p. 301.
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out of order to inquire into the comparative validity of the
portraits of "radical" professors presented by Lewis and Herrick
respectively. V/ith regard to Lewis's "Wild Man", anyone fam-
iliar with university life knows that this is a lihel upo^ the
few professors who do realize the need for continuity between
the function of the college and the social problems "outside",
and who recognize their professional responsibility to apply
their own understanding to a clarification of those problems.
Insofar as Lewis maintains pretensions toward presenting the
''real facts" he can be criticized on a factual basis; in this
respect it is apparent that his Vif'ild ^'^an is not symtomatic of
that class of university professors it claims to represent.
On the other hand, Herrick 's portrayal of Beckwith, far
from being a romanticizat ion of the role, was a conservative
portrayal of a living person who could have served as the model.
It is not claimed here that Herrick did model Beckwith after one
of his colleagues, but that he could easily have done so. For
Chimes is quite obviously the outgrowth of Herrick *s own exper-
ience of teaching at the University of Chicago over a period
of years, ^uring that time he was in the -l^iglish Department
as a colleague of Robert Morse Lovett, an ardent liberal of long
standing. Lovett had been a militant pacifist during World War
I, a strong supporter of progressive movements all over the
country after the Vi/ar, had been burned in effigy (as was Beck-
with), was investigated by an Illinois Senate investigating co-
mmittee for purportedly teaching communism and birth control.
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and in the controversy was backed by President Hut chins, and
finally to assure his rightful place as a liberal, he was on
innumerable blacklists of the F.B.I, (l) "^his is offered in
such detail merely as a concrete illustration that significant
literature, as considered here, far from being a distortion
of "reality" is inclined to be much closer to "reality" than
the journalistic naturalism of Lewis. (2)
While the conception of tolerance is to be aj)plied largely
in relation to religious and moral and intellectual beliefs ,
that is, its greatest import being to an inner security and
integrity of self, its correlative value, respect for the indivi-
dual, is of primary importance in its application to personality
manifestation . It is true that this very easily shades off into
the areas of social and intellectual democracy, an aspect to a
greater or less degree of all the values to be taken up, but
for the time being it will be held as closely as possible to the
terms of respect for the individual personality. Bryce men-
tions this area of value but without effort at further clarifi-
cation, as "The natural impulse of every citizen in America..
•
to respect every other citizen, and to feel that citizenship
constitutes a certain ground of respect." (s) However, this is
only partially true, for quite obviously, that "best American"
(1) Lovett, Robert M., All Our Years . New York: The Viking Press', 1948.
(2) Journalistic naturalism as a descriptive term of Lewis's mode
of writing refers to (a) the exclusive focus upon "facts" as
such, , without attempt at clarification or interpretation and (b)
the traditional literary mode of "naturalism" as an intense focus
upon the limitations of life, and the "natural" presentation of
the elements of experience without benefit of artistic re- i,
arrangement •
(3) Commager, Henry Steele, Op . clt. , p. 158.

33
with whom we are concerned does not inquire into a perso^gi's
citizenship before respecting him.
Its source is in the belief in freedom of conscience,
reinforced by the doctrine of the natural rights of man. '^he
present conception probably was further modified through the
effect of village and small town life, •'^or there, it was and
is a practical necessity to have concern for the impingement
of one personality on another, due to the limited scope of
relationships and the difficulty of voluntarily extending them.
If not modified in the village and town life, it is difficult
to conceive where it did occur-—certainly not in the urban
areas
•
This view of the respect for the individual personality,
as something not quite equivalent to either social or intellec-
tual democracy, and also different from tolerance, is best ex-
pressed in that admirable essay by William '^ames, "On a Certain
Blindness". Wherever, states James, there is an eagerness com-
municated in the life-process, that life becomes genuinely
significant; for
•••wherever it is found, there is the zest, the tingle,
the excitement of reality; and there is 'importance' in
the only real and positive sense in which importance
ever anywhere can be. (l)
And because the spectator can never comprehend the full inner
significance of another life-process, Samoa maintains that this
il) "^ames, William, Essays on Faith and Morals , New York:




• . •commsLnds us to tolerate, respect, and indulge those
whom we see harmlessly interested and happy in their own
ways, however unintelligible these may he to us. iiands
off: neither the v;hole of truth nor the whole of good
is revealed to any single observer •...( 1
)
There are two aberrational manifestations of this which
are more important in a consideration of the v»n?itings of Herrick
and Lewis than the original value. Both manifestations emerge
from a behavior pattern which can be termed "brittle individua-
lism", the core of which is an inflated concern for one's own
ego. As a result of this exaggerated ego concern the individual
has a distorted view of the "objective" relations in his enviro-
nment. This in turn conduces to a false evaluation of the process
of interaction between the individual and his environment, i.e.,
the process of human experience. As a result, the depth and
content of the experienced realizations of the relationships
in this process are insufficient to provide the individual with
an adequate base for further evaluation. Hence, the self does
not achieve the necessary plasticity and flexibility to effect
a continuous and cumulative process of readjustment to the
impingements of its environment. Accordingly, the relationships
which the individual establishes with his environment, and those
which are instituted within his own being, are too brittle to
absorb the impingements of his environment. In a liEe manner,
such brittle relationships preclude the achievement of an evol-
(1) Ibid, p. 284.
I

vlng equilibrium in relation to a process re^ility—-the result
being Inhibition of Individual growth.
The first aspect is an overly-socialized manifestation of
the traditional respect for the individual, resulting in an
indiscriminate acceptance of anyone who is a financial success,
irrespective of personal integrity, individual qualifications,
etc. It first appeared over a wide area after the Civil War,
although Josiah Royce, in his study of the California gold
rush, stated that from 1849 to 1851, there was a "carelessly
criminal tolerance" in the mining camps, (l) It was the result
of a number of factors, among them a pervasive sense of irre-
sponsibility, a lack of wives and fsunily organization, the
miners drifting alone from one camp to another or at the most
in pairs, and of course, the speculative fever throughout all
California. (2 ) The condition was not bettered until more com-
plicated machinery was introduced which necessitated group
efforts and mutual responsibilities*
Hugo Munsterberg referred to the inherent danger of this
type of "brittle individualism", in the operation of the
"spirit of initiative" in conjunction with the respect for the
individual, the former being "in danger of becoming inexcusable
arrogance as to one^s abilities and sad underestimation of the
value of professional training". (3) As it developed on a
!• Royce, Josiah, California, A Study of American Character
.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, p. 281.
2. Ibid , pp. 214-228.
3. Munsterberg, Hugo, The Americans > New York: McClure, Phillips
& Co,f 1905 f p. 25-26.
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national scale after the Civil War it was the result of the
fortunes made during the War, the unparalleled industrial
advancement, and equally intensified development on the fron-
tier, all of which activity was heightened by the post-War
fever of speculation in land and railroads and commodities.
With it came an increasing laxity in public and private morals,
as reflected in the corruption of the Grant administration and
shady financing, and a growing personal and social irresponsibi-
lity.
As extended into the present period it has resulted in
the prostitution of professional integrity and the commerciali-
zation of virtually every area of activity as a result of the
get-rich-quick philosophy which carried into the Twentieth
Century, following closely upon that behavior pattern has
arrived the get-wise-quick philosophy which has flowered in
such diverse areas as the Self-Culture schemes advertized in
the back of pulp magazines and the introduction of survey
courses in the universities. This ^area of brittle individualisn
comprises a large part- of Lewis's focus as is evidenced in the
treatment of Babbitt's son and the easy knowledge schemes (l),
as well as Babbitt's view of a "practical" education:
but smatter of fact, there's a whole lot of valuable
time lost even at the U., studying poetry and French
and subjects that never brought in anybody a cent.
I don't know but what maybe these correspondence-
1. Lewis, Sinclair e. Babbit, New ^ork: ftarcoiirt. Brace &
Co., 1922, p. 78-84.
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courses might prove to be one of the most important
American invent ions . (l)
Lewis's conception of professional integrity, which is the
vocational manifestation of the version of brittle indivldualisn
is adequately revealed in Arrowsmith , in the annual address
of Dr. Roscoe Geake, profess or of "otolaryngology":
Knowledge is the greatest thing in the medical world
but it's no good whatever unless you can sell it, and
to do this you must first impress your personality on
the people who have the dollars. V/hether r patient is
a new or an old friend, you must always use
'
salesmanship
on him. Explain to him, also to his stricken and anxious
family, the hard work and thought you are giving to his
case, and so make him feel that the good you have done
him, or intend to do him, is even greater than the fee
you plan to charge. Then, when he gets your bill, he
will not misunderstand or kick. (2)
It is characteristic of Lewis's whole approach that he
simply presents the "facts" In this manner without concern for
the meaning behind the facts, without questioning what such
professional standards mean to a culture and to the individual,
how they developed, or how dry rot can set in upon a culture in
which the groups most equipped to clarify it have rejected all
conception of social responsibility.
At the same time there developed the cult of self-expres-
sion, the frenetic desire to live the "full life". A chief
manifestation of this was the Lost Generation of Hemingway and
F.Scott Fitzgerald. In his discussion of the revolt against
the genteel tradition. Merle Curti states that
1. Ibid, p. 85.
2. Lewis, Sinclair, Arrowsmith » New York: Random House, Inc.,




The breakdown of many inhibitions during the war,
the popularization of Freudian and behavioristic
psychology, and the growing economic independence
of women on all levels explain in part the wide '
spread defiance of so-called Puritanism and Vic-
torianisra, . .during the nineteen-twenties . The
general reaction against conventional moral idealism
contributed, of course, to this revolt. (l)
Among the pseudo-intellectuals and the dissillusioned youn^
cynics to whom virtue was "the reward of dullness and the pun-
ishment of the drab", this movement was also a reaction against
the sort of brittle individualism discussed above in the re-
lation to Babbitt .(cf. p» 32.) And in addition, not only was
it a reaction against "conventional moral idealism", but more
important, it was a reaction against all standards of value.
In part it was in the spirit of the traditional American ideal
of breaking with deference to the past, but only in part, "^or
the Lost Generation rejected outmoded standards of value, but
lacked the intellectual integrity and stamina to erect Its ow n«
To a certain extent this is illustrated in its reaction to the
popularization of Freudian and behavioristic psychology"men-
tioned by Curti a factor of both cause and effect. Instead
of assimilating an understanding of these psychologies---whether
popularized or scientifically presented—-into an integrated
and coherent approach to life, thereby establishing a new stan-
dard of values, the brittle individualist rejected all concern
for human values by reducing human experience to the mechanisms
LCurti, Merle, The Growth of American Thoug!:ht > New "^orks
Harper ^ Brothers, Publishers, 1943, p. 710.
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of the biological sex drive and basic impulses, '•'•'his pattern
of behavior and thought is criticized by Herrlck in The End of
Desire, when Redfield, the sensitive and responsive psychiatrist
discusses sex relations with the brittle psychologist, Serena
MasseyJ
Evidently the modern notion is that it is poor taste
to speak of the mental aspect of amorous impulses*.
•
What you call love is hardly capable of scientific
treatment , • • •
Probably not—-and yet to discuss the coupling habits
of human beings without any reference to the emotions
aroused by them, the psychical atmosphere, seems to
me equally unscientific—-and futile.
The subject was the technique of sex relations, not
their content,..
•
Precisely---and I do not believe you can treat what
you call "Sex technique" without considering the
content. If you do it becomes just a contrivance for
so many human couplings, and that doesn't interest
me greatly, (l)
At the other end of the continuum of distorted manifesta-
tions of respect for the individual is a phase which is largely
a twentieth-century phenomenon; that is, the over-intellectual-
ized concern for the "privacy" of the self. This form of
"brittle individualism" stems in part from the same source as
the over-socialized; this may seem a paradox, but the con-
tributing factors are apparent, ^'or both forms are essentially
extensions of the Romantic conception of the importance of the
self. While one form, under the impingement of forces already
considered, (cf • pp. 33-34) emerged as a no-holds-barred self-
aggrandizement, self-glorification, and self-expression, the
!• Herrick, Robert, The End
.
of Desire » vMew York: Farrar &






other form became an inversion of the same energies.
The inverted form was perhaps given its major impetus by
the discoveries of Freud and the subsequent developments in be-
haviorism and MacDougell*s instinct psychology, for at this
time the extreme of the Romantic conception of the self in-
directly gained a scientific and intellectual "respectability"
desperately needed in a materialistic age. The major concern
manifested by the intellectualized brittle individualist is for
the so-called inviolability of the self* This conception em-
|>hasized the fragility of the ego to such an extent that any
impingement of the environment became a traumatic experience---
resulting in such varied manifestations as the lonely recluses
of Greenwich Village, oyer-protection of children, and the
"sensitive" person. Let it be understood that the writer does
not claim that these manifestations were caused by the previous-
•
ly mentioned psychologies, but merely facilitated by their
mi s int erpr et at ion
.
One result of the exaggerated concern for the sacred
"privacy of the self" was the prohibiting of emotional involv-
ments which were feared as restrictions against a full self-
1 realization. Russell Lynes refers to one aspect of this in a
recent article on the professional "intellectuals" of New
York when he states that the intellectual is "distinguished by
a state of mind and a lack of status in the community" • (l)
1. Lynes, Russell, "Intellectuals vs. Phillistines" , The New
York Times Book Review, July 10, 1949, p. 1,
c
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Later he refers to the state of mind as being "full of their
own problems and concerned with being marginal men".(l)
It is this general phase of brittle individualism which
receives some of Herrick's heaviest indictment, for he is well
aware that such a behavior pattern has dangerous repercussions
in the corporate life of society; but even more important, it
erects a shell around the individual cutting him off from life
and restricting individual growth. It is largely this aspect
which is his focus in The Bnd of Desire , an inquiry into the
extra-marital sex relations of two highly endowed people, ^'he
title has a double symbolism, in that the "end" is interpreted
as the termination, as well as the functional end of desire.
In considering the behavior of Serena Massey, the author states
that
It was her way of preserving before the world the
fiction of a complete independence, a separate
existence from his or anybody's, no matter how
intimate their relations might be in, fact.*- (2)
The vocational manifestation of such a perspective is
clarified in the author's presentation of the conflict between
the two peoples
Cooperation, the doing together of something important,
was the root of his impulse in life, the guiding princi-
ple of all the plans he made, little and large. Serena
had often argued the point with him, taking the view
that men and women got more by contributing indepen-
dently to each other rather than by any effort for
cooperation. (3)
1. IjOC .cit .
2. Herrick, Robert, Op. Cit
.
, p. 4.
3. Ibid, p. 67.
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It is not difficult to see what implications this has to
the American cultural pattern, in terms of corporate as well as
individufiil life. One need look no further than the activity of
the over-specialized "scholars" in American higher learning and
witness their inadequacies to cope with the realities of any but
their own narrow area of experience. It was this consideration
which once prompted Chancellor Hut chins to remark that college
they
professors had become so specialized that/could no longer con-
verse with one another on anything but the weather. One wonders
if this doesn't have much to do with the soul-searching and
questioning of the purpose of higher education, ^'or it is only
through the cooperative achievement of mutually realized values
that any institutional life can maintain an organic integrity
and unity of purpose—whether a university or a family.
It is this which is, in the final analysis, the major
factor in individual growth as well as institutional perfection.
For it is through such cooperative realization of values that
the individual discovers new areas of experience, and in the
deepening interpenetrat ion with his feilow man discovers that
"inner significance" of another life mentioned by Jsunes as the
basis of respect for the individual. Thus the individual is
both sensitized to new areas of life and responsive to the lives
of others, both of which conduce to his own expended growth.
It is this which is the "end of desire". Herrick reaffirms this
aspect in Chimes, where he opposes the lives of Beckwith and




His prodigality had kept him as fresh and youthful
as Jessica^s refusals. From now on, Claverein
thought, the odds would be against Jessica* (1)
Also emerging from the belief in freedom of conscience is
the conception of intellectual democracy. The perspective of
this paper is not meant to imply that the formulat ion of the
particular values has remained the same from the time of
Jefferson to the present day. However, it is believed that
their basic functions have remained largely unchanged even
though there have been accretions and refinements from one
period to the next, and even though social and economic condi-
tions have affected the degree to which the democratic values
have been realized. That is to say, the relationships among the
values have remained basically unaltered, and the entire stnuc-
ture is functionally oriented toward the cultivation of indivi-
dual growth, and has been since the beginning of anything which
could be called distinctively American. As Emerson stated:
the true test of civilization is, not the census,
nor the size of cities, not the crops,-—no, but
the kind of men the country turns out * (2 ) ( Italics mine.)
Nor is this individualistic perspective less valid today in the
light of increasing socialization. For, unlike the quasi-mys-
tical view of Marxism in which one supposedly realizes his
individuality in the State, American corporateness interacts
with individualism and is not a prior condition for it.
1. Herrick, Robert, Chimes, New York: The ttacMillan Co., 1926,
p. 301.
2. Emerson, Ralph Waldo, Society and Solitude . Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin & Company, 1940, p. 34.
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L But to return to the origin of the conception of intel-
lectual democracy, perhaps it would be worth while to survey
briefly its development from its origins to the present day
in order to illustrate the writer's conception of the proeess
of growth characteristic of American values. Charles and Mary
Beard stated that.
To Massachusetts Bay, during the early years, came
more than one hundred graduates of Cambridge and
Oxford Universities. •• •Some of the later colonists
• ••were educated at the best Catholic institutions
in Europe. Among the leaders in all the colonies
were men who had studied law at the Temple in London,
or theology, natur&l philosophy, the classics, medi-
cine, and other branches of learning at the best
institutions in Great Britain, on the Continent, or
in both places. (l)
And with regard to colonial women, they wrote:
In every colony were numerous women of English,
Dutch, Huguenot, and other national, origins who
had been trained in the classics and modern li-
terature—-women of the planting and professional
circles, women of the great landed and mercantile
families. And a stream of hired tutors in the
prosperous families maintained the standard of
the proprieties for sons and daughters. (2
)
However, this can hardly be considered intellectual de-
mocracy, for it was neither democratic in its aims nor in its
application; but neither were the colonials "Americans" at
this time. The real beginning of intellectual democracy is
not be seen perhaps until the growing dissension between the
colonials and the British governing class. The conception of
1. Beard, Charles A. & Mary R., Op. Cit » • p« 48.
2. Ibid, p. 54.
1
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that period was early phrased by John Adams in 1765:
Let us dare to read, think, speak and write. Let
every order and degree among the people rouse their
attention and animate their resolution. ( l) (Italics mine.)
As the colonies emerged from the revolution, it was natural
that the conception of democracy should be voiced largely in
terms of freedom rather than organization. With a whole con-
tinent before, him, all that an industrious and reasonably
Intelligent man needed was to be unmolested and unrestricted.
This conception carried into the non-material aspects of de-
mocracy as well, as evidenced by a letter Jefferson wrote to
Col. Humphreys in 1789, with reference to certain provisions
of the Constitution:
There are rights which it is useless to surrender
to the government, and which governments have yet
always been found to invade. These are the rights
of thinking, and publishing our thought by speak-
ing or writing; the right of free commerce; the
right of personal freedom. (2
)
And to Wythe in 1786 he had written:
I think by far the most important bill in our whole
code, is that for the diffusion of knowledge among
the people. No other sure foundation can be devised,
for the preservation of freedom and happiness. (3)
However, it was not for several decades that Jefferson's
ideal began to be realized. In the meantime colleges and
academies had sprung up, but still largely devoted to the
patrician concept of education; for it was not until after the
1. Ibid, p. 55.
2.,«Jefferson, Thomas, Jefferson's Letters , Eau Claire, Wise.:
E.M. Hale & Co., p. 109.
3. Jefferson, Thomas, Thomas Jefferson on Democracy , ^^ew ^ork:
Penguin Books Inc., 1959, p. 87.
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Jacksonian administration that the conception of intellectual
democracy fully emerged. It, then, included more than just
formal education, and in this respect Curti writes:
This was Isirgely accomplished through the improvement
of existing cultural institutions and the rise of new
agencies. The three decades preceeding the Civil War
saw the appearance of the penny newspaper and inex-
pensive magazine and hook, the lyceum platform and
the public library. It was the age of the common school
awakening, the development of the academy, the emergence
of the high school, and the multiplication of colleges. (l)
Emerson gave voice to the ideal of this period when he stated
that one of the measirpes of culture was
diffusion of knowledge, overrunning all the old
barriers of caste, and by the cheap press, bring-
ing the university to every poor man's door in the
newsboy's basket. (2)
With the rapid technological advances and the industrializa
tion and urbanization after the Civil War, the concept of in-
tellectual democracy attained even greater momentum* It was
during this period that it developed perhaps its most distinc-
tively American characteristic, thus moving toward the modern
formulation. Merle Ciarti remarked concerning this phase of
development that
The gulf between the knowledge of the intellectual
and that of the common people has always been wide,
everywhere, but it has been less wide and deep in
America than elsewhere. In this fact, perhaps, lies
the linique characteristic of American intellectual
history. In the last hundred years steady progress
haa has been made toward bridging the gap, toward extend-
ing to the people a larger measure of opportunity for
1. Curti, Merle, Op. Cit.
. p. 344.





taking part on some level in the life of the mind.Cl)
•^e attributes much of this growth to the "indigenous American
faith in the desirability and necessity of applying the demo-
cratic principle to the intellectual life". (2)
We have seen the concept of intellectual democracy develop
from its emphasis upon individual freedom to think and express
one's thoughts as he pleases, to its extension into public re-
sponsibility for education, freedom of inquiry, and an intel-
lectually free and inexpensive press. From there it advanced
to a focus upon further popularization of knowledge in all areas
and a lessening of the intellectual gulf between the scholar
and the common man. I^his last phase is manifested in the in-
numerable community agencies, college extension and correspond-
ence courses, and such "serious" radio programs as "Town Meet-
ing of the Air" and the "University Theatre", ^'inally, it is
manifested in the growing awareness of corporate responsibility
as seen in the increasing Federal aid to education. This last
phase, in which individualism and co-operative corporateness
are reconciled, is best expressed by John Dewey, when he
states that
Everything discovered belongs to the commimity of
workers • Every new idea and theory has to be sub-
mitted to this community for confirmation and test.
There is an expanding community of cooperative effort
and of truth. (3) (italics mine.)
1. Curti, Merle, Op. Git
.
, p. 593.
2. Ibid , p. 594.
3* Dewey, John, Intelligence in the iJodern World, New ^ork:
Random House, Inc., 1939, p. 459.
f
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And in expressing the traditional individualistic purpose in
American intelledtual democracy, he writes:
'I'he indictments that are drawn against the intel-
ligence of individuals are in truth indictments
of a social order that does not permit the avera^.e
individual to have acess to the rich store of the
accumulated wealth of mankind in knowledge, ideas
and purposes, -^here does not now exist the kind
of social organization that even permits the average
hiiman being to share the potentially ay.ailable social
intelligence. Still less is there a social order
that has for one of its chief purposes the establish-
ment of conditions that will move the mass of indivi-
duals to appropriate and use what is at hand. ( 1> ( -4; alios
mine •
)
It is important in considering the American conception of
corporateness in distinction to the Marxist and European to
note that Dewey speakes of the "mass of individuals", not the
"masses", and the "commianity of workers", not the "proletariat"
or the State.
is this latter aspect of intellectual democracy with
which Herrick is primarily concerned. In Chimes, his focus
Is upon the function of the American university in the reali-
zation of intellectual democracy. Eureka University on the
South side of Chicago, is an apt symbol of the problems faced
by the American university in its effort to achieve a truly
functional role in the American cultural pattern. It is un-
fortunate that there is not space here to consider those aspects
which emerged as distortions of American values, for it is in
this area that one finds some of Herrick ^s most penetrating
indictments. Such things as distorting the conception of
1* Ibid , p. 465>

49
Of American pragmatism to justify the "trade-school" movement
of business administration schools and increasing superficiality
of subject matter, the encroachments of the mercantile mind
through the control of trustees, "the tendency to substitute
the captain of industry in the place of the priest" (l), the
American distaste for abstractions being manifested in a focus
upon "facts" at the expense of meaning and the conception of
value—-all of these aspects and many others receive his atten-
tion. But his main focus is upon the effort to clarify the
role of the university in the development of the individual,
that is, the process of e-duc at ion # and the development of an
applied social intelligence*
In referring to Edith Crandall, the Dean of V/omen, and her
efforts to further equality in education for women, the princi«
pie character reflects on the fact that the real monument which
was erected in her honor was not the carillon in the tower, but
•••lay in the lives of those women throughout the
country, who at the magic touch of her enthusiasm
and quick sympathy had been stirred to reach for
richer fulfillment of themselves. (2)
And near the end, Clavercin decided that though the uni-
versity might often be "fantastically employed, according to
the necessities or the whims of the moment", the important
thing was that it remained "an idea, an aspiration" . ^3^
1. Veblen, Thor stein. The Theory of the Leisure Class j New York!
Random House, inc., 1934, p. 374.
2. Herrick, Robert, O^. Git p« 34.
3. Tbid, p. 268.
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So it was foolish to worry over what the youth
of the day picked up from their courses, whether
they stored their minds with this or that infor-
mation, cultivated this or that faculty, so long
as the university gave them the desire to under-
stand, to grope onwards deeper and deeper into
the mystery of existence. And every true teacher
tried to give them this inspiration. (l)
And in order to achieve this he realized that
Learning to become productive must have within
it the vital stir, compact of perception and
imagination: must be creative. The mere accu-
mulation of fact, the ingenious composition of
theory. ..was not enough.Ts)
However, Herrick was too familiar with the academic v/orld
to believe that this was the rule rather than the ideal. On
the contrary, one of his major concerns was to expose the limi-
tations of the all-too-prevalent brittle individualism of the
academician and "scholar"; for not only did it inhibit the
vital relationship between student and professor which is
necessary for the educative process, but it also repressed
creative thought and prevented the development of a cooperative
and socially applied intelligence.
With the increasing degree of specialization they
were cut off from each other in little provinces
of thought and Interest; knowledge had become an




Herrick also was aware that in order to overcome this
brittle individualism, and its repressive consequences for both
the individual and society, we must have that "inner zest", the
1. Ibid, p. 269.
2. Ibid , p. 222.
3. Ibid , p. 72.
r
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vital stir of a harmoniously organized self referred to as
Emersonian individualism.
...scholarship to be enduring must be creative,
must be based on all human faculties, emotional
as well as mental, and the few great scholars
whom Clavercin had known proved it •••"If I had
the moulding of a university", Clavercin mused,
"I would look for hearty mem, good livers and
lovers, passionate men, who thought with their
whole being, not merely with their minds.... I'd
get rid of the ascetic idea". (1)
It is the "hearty" type, the "American Scholar" of vitality and
a socially applied creativity who is symbolized in Beckwith,
as opposed to the fact-gathering brittle individualist, Jessica
Mailory
.
Some consideration has already been given to Lewis's
treatment of the American faith in public education, practi-
cality in education, commercialization and hypocrisy in the
field of higher learning, and the get-wise-quick philosophy,
^cf. p. 30 , 36). i'or this reason there is no need to go further
into it. However, it might just be mentioned in passing, that
his "philosophic perspective" in this area also is the control-
ling factor in determining his focus. And he is even less
equipped to clarify properly what those ideals and values are.
Consequently, the process of education is reduced by Lewis to
the mere acquisition of facts and the development of technique.
This is quite evident in the musings of Arrowsmith, who, it
is safe to assume, represents as high an order of awareness and





Arrowsmith, "the doctor in whom a holy flame is kindled" (Dust
Jacket ) who
insisted that no one could expect more than,
by stubhorness or luck, to have the kind of work
he enjoyed and an ability to become better aC'-
guainted with the facts of that work than the
averag:e .1ob»holder » i 1 J (Italics mine ."5
For this reason it will perhaps Ije more fruitful to con-
sider Lewis's treatment of certain other aspects of intellectual
democracy than that of education and the extension of knowledge
for individual growth. It was mentioned earlier that this con-
ception of intellectual democracy also extended into the belief
in freedom of inquiry, a free press, academic freedom, etc.
Most of these, quite obviously stem from the American faith in
freedom of conscience, and were embodied in the early Jeffer-
sonian conception of intellectual democracy, '^o judge by such
present encroachments as revealed in Howard K. Beale's Are
American Teachers Free ? (1) and the wild hysteria of Federal
and State un-American Activities Committees aided and abetted
by generals-turned-university-presidents, it may be that liberal
thought will once again have to focus upon the early Revolution-
ary concept of democracy. And it is with this in mind that we
will consider Lewis's treatment of the issue in It Can 't Happen
Here . It is in such a treatment as this, in which Lewis was
ostensibly concerned with the survival of democratic values, that
!• Lewis, Sinclair, Arrowsmith, Hew York: Random House. Inc..
(cpr. by -^arcourt. Brace & Co., inc., 1925), p. 282-3.
2. Beale, Howard K., Are American Teachers Free? Part XII,
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936, p« ix-xxii.
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his extreme limitations and pretentious superficiality are most
apparent, ^'or it is not unfair to assume that in his effort to
clarify the danger to American values he would attempt to go
as far into the meaning of American culture as he could*
Perhaps the best way to approach the area dealt with in
It Can 't Happen Here is with a view toward clsirifying the po-
sition or the meaning of the "American liberal intellectual".
Insofar as intellectual democracy is the main bulwark for all
the democratic values, and the "liberal intellectual" presumably
the main defender of intellectual democracy, this seems a jus-
tifiable approach for an analysis of Lewises inquiry in It
Can 't Happen Here . Further, it is as a liberal that Doremus
Jessup, the Vermont small-town editor is characterized; and
since he is the only articulate character in the book who is
sympathetically portrayed it is reasonable to assume that he
is the exponent of Lewis's views on the subject
•
It might be well to mention at this point my own conception
of the American liberal; we will dispense hereafter with the
appendage "intellectual", since almost all liberals privately
consider, but do not publicly proclaim, their status as "in-
tellectuals". The belief represented in this paper is that the
American liberal is that person most aware of the full meaning
and implication of the American structure of values. For, as
this paper will attempt to make apparent, if such a person has
this awareness that fact itself impels him to devote his energies
toward a fuller realization of these values. In short, it impels
fc
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him to work for the corporate application of accumulated sociaJ.
intelli=!:ence , directed toward the fuller realization of the
individual potentialities ih life. This, it is believed, is a
necessary conclusion of the organic relationships among these
values* Consequently, the American liberal is, by the very
nature of his situation, a radical—-in the most fundamental
sense of the term. He is aware that it is only through a
radical re-orientation of the existing social structure that
these values can be realized. This obviously, is not the popu-
lar conception of a "radical", for it goes far beyond that. It
is unfortunate that the terra has been arrogated by mere economic
determinists . For its meaning in the present context is just
the opposite of those various shades of Marxism which are popu-
larly considered radical. In the present context it implies
a break-down of the very compartment allz at ion of thought and
life which i*larxisra posits as the only answer. It Implies a
social Integration of the various areas of experience, a
humanization and integration of science and philosophy, and a
restoration of art and education in vital relationship with
other areas of human experience. But to return to Doremus
Jessup and Lewis's conception of the American liberal*
He was, and he knew it , a small-town bourgeois
Intellectual. Russia forbade everything that
made his toil worth enduring: privacy, the
right to think and to criticize as he freakishly
pleased. (l)
1. Lewis, Sinclair, It Can 't Happen Here, Garden City, N.Y.:




Although expressed in the vernacular, one might gather
from the above that for Lewis also the distinctive feature of
the liberal intellectual is his clarified understanding of
the meaning of American values. However, he soon dispels this
impression, ^or when Doremus joins the underground, and is
i repelled by their ruthlessness when in contact with the Marxists
he is forced to clarify his own position which is done with
the characteristic Lewis ant i- intellectualism?
I*m middle-class intellectual. I'd never call
myself any such a damn silly thing, but since
you Reds coined it, I'll have to accept it. That's
my class, and that's what I'm interested in. '^'he
proletarians are probably noble fellows, but I
certainly do not think that the interests of the
middle-class intellectuals and the proletarians
are the same. They want bread. We want---well,
all right, say it, we want cakel And when you get
a proletarian ambitious enough to want cake, too
-
—why, in America, he becomes a middle-class
intellectual just as fast as he can---if he canZ (l)
Thus even the so-called intellectual is reduced to the
same level of mere organic activity which Lewis holds as chara-
cteristic of all human experience-
—
just the "average guy" who
wants to get a little bit more from the economic scramble. Al-
though it may be argued that some people do live on a level
higher than this, they are not symptomatic of the potentialities
of human experience and it certainly not representative of the
large body of American liberals who are motivated by a sense
of social responsibility and the desire to contribute to a
clarification of social values. Nor, even if Lewis's conception




were true, would the presentation of it be a clarification of
the meaning of American culture and what it has to offer. There
would, in fact, be no such thing as culture, whatever one may
mean by the term. But this is followed by an even more ori-
ginal conception of the American liberal. For when Doremus is
really pushed to the wall in his argument with the Marxists,
he plays his final card:
Listen, Comrade -K-arl, Windrip and Hitler will join
Stalin long before the descendents of Dan'l Webster*
You see, we don*t like murder as a way of argument
---that's what really marks the liberall (l)
That indeed represents a remarkable penetration into the
meaning of American life. It also overlooks the fact that
there were numerous liberals engaged in argument during the
American Revolution and the Civil War. And it makes it ex-
ceedingly difficult to identify a liberal in distinction from
say, a Taft Republican, when such minor things as public hous-
ing. Federal aid to education, etc., are under consideration.
It should be emphasized in this respect that Lewis is quite ob-
viously not indulging himself in the sort of intentional burles-
que of American life presented in Babbitt or Elmer G-antry
For it is apparent that in this book, he is attempting to make
a serious inquiry into American values, and the absurdity and
superficiality of his approach is most evident when he attempts
to show how native American fascism can develop.
1. Ibid , p. 251.
cc
57
The one thing that most perplexed him was there
could be a dictator seemingly so different from
the fervent Hitler and gesticulating Fascists and
the Caesars with laurels round hald domes; a
dictator with something of the earthy American
sense of humor of a Msirk Twain, a George Ade, a
Will Rogers, an Artemus Ward,(tbe composite type), "KVindrip
could "p be ever so funny about solemn jaw-dropping
opponents and about the best method of training
what he called "a Siamese flea hound", (l)
Consequently, it is the very thing he sets out to consider
»hich Lewis most ignores, that is, the strenght of the American
values themselves. His whole explanation for the development of
fascism is in the appeal of a funny-man dictator; and in all
other respects the Windrip fascism is a caricature of Hitlerism.
There is no inquiry into the meaning or function of the democratic







pespect, it is a direct contravention of the conclusion reached
Dy James Bryce in his opinion of the strength and stability of
bnerican democracy?
In some countries men of brilliant gifts may be
dangerous to freedom; but the ambition of Ameri-
can statesmen has been schooled to flow in con-
stitutional channels, and the Republic is strong
enough to stand any strain to which the rise of
heroes may expose her .(2)
•he possibility of a fascist ic America Is not denied, although
Lt is considered highly unlikely; however, if fascism were to
levelop in America it would be more likely that it would come
ibout through the quiet and unobtrusive collaboration of park-
lench elder statesmen, militarists and pen-stripe suited busi-
L. Ibid, p. 171.
I, Commager, Henry Steele, Op, Cit., p. 150.
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ness men rather than the demagoguery of a Buzz Windrip.
Finally, Lewis's understanding of American life is so
utterly superficial that he has Doremus Jessup talk himself
into a faith which lies at the very core of all authoritarian-
ism. For when the counter-revolution is initiated, Doremus,
ilike the good liberal that he is, gives consideration to the
problem of a reconstruction of society:
Whs.tever happens, whatever details of a new system
of government may be decided on, whether we call it
a "Cooperative Commonwealth" or "State Socialism"
or "Communism" or "Revived Traditional Democracy"
•••that government is««^a universal partnership,
in which the State must .own all resources so large
that they affect all members of the State , and in
which the one worst crime won't be murder or kid-
napping but taking advant age of the State * >(!) (Italics mine)
The "descendant of Dan'l Webster" has simply re-phrased
the idea which all totalitarian states have used to justify
every conceivable crime against humanity, ^t should also be
noted that Doremus uses the concept of the "State", which is in
Itself a concept of European totalitarianism rather than Ameri-
can democracy. The American liberal is inclined to think in
such terms as humanity, society, the common man, or the like,
rather than the State, the latter term having definite conno-
tations of the quasi-mystical authoritarian philosophies of
Europe.
It is a debatable issue as to whether or not Lewis is
aware of his own limitations in understanding the basic meanings





underlying the surface of American life. Be that as it may,
he has developed certain techniques which are inclined to ob-
scure these limitations and which achieve that degree of veri-
similitude which has been responsible for the critical consen-
sus. One of these is his episodic method, which steps up the
tempo of "action" and makes for a very fast-moving plot, such
as it is. However, in as much as Lewis's characters are not
representative of human experience, one cannot really say that
his works have any plots, that is, if one considers the plot
as the actions which flow from the personalities of the indi-
vidual characters* In this sense each of Lewis's works is
merely a manipulated succession of situations, rather than the
development of the organic relationships among the characters
which constitutes an authentic plot.
Another technique is that which has been mentioned by a
number of his critics, usually in an adulatdry fashion, as his
brilliant power of mimicry. Mr. Carl Van Dor en notes this in
his extravagant eulogy of Mr. Lewis, in which he refers to one
of Lewis's conversational tricks J
Mr. Lewis's mimicry is amazing, largely vocal.
tries, not to look the role he is playing, but to
sound it. Himself to the eye, to the ear he can be
any human noise at will.d)
Now, it is not argued that that is not a wholly remarkable,
and on occasion, perhaps valuable taBtent; only, it is perhaps
1. Van Doren, Carl, Sinclair Lewis , Garden City, N.Y.s Double-
day, Doran & Co,, Inc., p. 30
i
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more suited to the music hall and burlesque theatre than as an
index of sgnificant literature, 'i'his is not intended to he
facetious, either, for the above statement emerges from a well-
grounded belief that one cannot mimic the meaning or significance
of an experience. One can mimic the circumstances of a situation ,
and it still remains a situation and not an experience, but that
does not convey illumination or understanding concerning the
meaning of the experience. In short, one can only mimic sur-
face characteristics. Mr. Van Doren touches on this aspect,
without understanding its implications, in a passage following
the above. He writes that Lewis's
••.talent for mimicry is perhaps a symptom^..
That is, he seems to wear a skin which is all
eyes, all ears, all nerves of sense. Life
beats on him like, suns, drums, hammers; like
searchlights, calliopes, stinging nettles. Small
irritations make him fractious. Crowds wear him
out. New York disintegrates him.(l)
Perhaps this is the basis for i»1r. Lewis's exclusive con-
cern with the "^facts" of a situation, and explains his tendency
to go into such myriad detail concerning people, places, events,
etc. And indeed, it would be cruel for us to insist on his
subjecting himself to the "stinging nettles" of life in order
to penetrate further into its meaning. Perhaps in the light
of his extreme hypersensitivity, we should be thankful for his
self-sacrifice in subjecting himself to life at all, merely
in order to inform his benighted and insensitive public. How-
1. Ibid, p. 31.
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ever, the present discussion is not merely to vent my own spleen
against Mr. Lewis, for it has bearing upon the final evaluation
of all his works, and especially the one under discussion.
In such a presumably serious satire on the insane desire
for power as Pt Caji 't Happen Here, the reader desires more than
just the "facts" which are open to one who wears a skin of "all
eyes, all ears, all nerves of sense". He desires these record-
ings of sensation to be informed with meaning, especially when
the subject-matter is as intimately related to American values
as that of this book» But instead Mr. Lewis merely presents
a stronger dose of facts, as when Doremus is taken into custody
by the fascist police:
The guard dashed down the corridor to a door with
the sign "Gents" hung out in front of it, came back
with paper, not clean, threw it in front of Doremus,
and yammered, "Gome on, boss. Show us how you write
your pieces I Con on, write us a piece—with your
nose! (l)
And shortly thereafter when Doremus failed to answer their
questions satisfactorily, he
•..was rushed across the room, into a cellar beyond.
A long wooden table there was dark with dry blood.
The guards seized Doremus, sharply jerked his head
back, pried open his jaws, and ponred in a quart of
castor oil. They tore off his garments above the
belt, flung them on the sticky floor, "^hey threw
him face downward on the long table and began to
lash him with a one-piece steel fishing rod. Each
stroke cut into the flesh of his back, and they beat
him slowly, relishing it, to keep him from fainting
too quickly. But he was unconscious when, to the
guards' great diversion, the castor oil took effect. (2)
1. Lewis, Sinclair, Op. Git
.
, p. 366
2. Ibid s p. 367.
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The effect of such writing was very penetratingly assessed
"by V. S, Pritchett in his review of a recent English political
satire when he wrote that
The contemporary satirist rejects the weapon of
Voltaire; he feels that he will get his effect
if he makes us feel weak and sick. He hopes (l
suspect) to give us the notorious obstinacy of
the fanatical invalids and their will to live.(l-)
It is this continual piling up of detail and overwhelming of
the reader with "facts", whether sickening or otherwise, which
Lewis utilizes as his basic technique, and for which he sac-
rifices all attempt to convey meaning.
1. Pritchett, V.S., "Letter from London," The New Yov\s. Times
Book Review
,





The concept of social democracy also emerges from and
finds its ultimate justification in individualism* This is
equally true in the historical sense, that is, in the early
formulation of the meaning of social democracy, as well as in
the modern sense. In the structure of values which we are
attempting to formulate here, it may be considered at the same
"level" as freedom of conscience. That is to say, that while
intellectual democracy emerges from freedom of conscience,
and is therefore, in a manner of speaking, twice removed from
individualism, social democracy is only once removed. It might
i
also be added that while much of the focus of intellectual
democracy has been upon the traditional freedoms of speech,
press, thought, and belief, social democracy is realized largely
in terms of social relationships.
It should be further remarked that this is not a class
interpretation of society, for the present conception of social
democracy is not incompatible with the formation of economic
classes. While it is recognized by the present writer as an
unfortunate and frequent occurrence that economic classes tend
to acquire certain social characteristics, the assumption is
that economic disparity as such is not inherently incompatible
with a realized social democracy. One other introductory
remark is perhaps advisable. The tendence in discussing such
ff
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a subject as social democracy is to equate the meaning of the
terra with "sociological". This to he discouraged; for when-
ever, in the course of this paper, the term "social" is used,
it is meant to convey something broader and deeper than
"sociological" as that term is usually understood. That is
part of its meaning, it is true, just as the conept of social
democracy includes the belief in racial equality. But "socio-
logical" is related to "social" in the same sense as the belief
in racial equality is related to the justification for that
belief. After all, why have racial equality? We know the
causes for such a belief, but what is sought here is a ration-
al justification. To supply that, is to supply content to our
conception of social democracy. Perhaps Jefferson can once
again furnish a lead to the process of giving content to our
terms, when he writes that
It should be further considered, that in America
no other distinction between man and man had ever
been known, but that of persons in office, exer-
cising powers by authority of the laws, and private
individuals. Among these last, the poorest laborer
stood on equal ground with the wealthiest millionaire,
and generally on a more favored one, whenever their
rights seemed to jar.(l)
Though John Adams and Hamilton may have disagreed with
Jefferson, the basis for this belief had a sotmd foundation
in the economic facts of the colonies. The availability of
land and the shortage of labor made it exceedingly difficult
to establish a landed gentry except in parts of the south and
!.Jefferson, Thomas, Thomas Jefferson on Democracy , New York:
_
Penguin Books, Inc., 1959, p. 80^
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among the Ihitch patroons. That such instances were too scarse
bo inhibit the growth of social democracy and the fluidity of
colonial society is attested to by Charles and Mary Beard,
In no way was the process better Illustrated than in
the case of indentured white servants. After their
term of service expired some of them were able to
climb the social stairs by marrying into already
prosperous families* Others were able to get land
by outright purchase or on mortgage .or by going
to the front ier. ... Indentured artisans and ...clerks
...went into industry or trade for themselves ••
•
In the seventeenth century, it is estimated, at least
lOOyOOO servants rose from bondage to freedom. (1)
Consequently, though social democracy was never completely
realized, it existed to a great enough degree so that it remaine(j.
as an ideal. However, the above formulation is still incomplete
in the modern sense in that its focus is almost exclusively
I
upon economic opportunity. Although it does suggest the inti-
mate relationship between vocational and social democracy which
will be developed later, (cf.p. 93-93, 112-116) Perhaps it will
be of aid to return to the previously discussed conception of
espect for the individual; it will be remembered that this was
mentioned as a shading off into the area of social democracy.
Nor should it be forgotten that respect for the individual was
characterized largely in terms of respect for individual per-
sonality manifestations, "ith regard to this aspect Hugo
Munsterberg is helpful in illuminating the relationship when
he writes that
1* Beard, Charles A. oc Mary R«, A Basic History of the United




The social sentiment of equality, although variously
tinged yet virtually the same throughout the United
States in nowise militates against social distinctions
v?hich result from difference of education, wealth,
occupation, and achievement. But it does demand that
all these different distinctions . shall be considered
external to the real personality . Fundajaent ally » all
Americans are equal « ( 1 } ( Italics mine .
)
It might be mentioned that Munsterberg was sometimes a
little too anxious to apologize for the wealthy and the well-
born, and the present writer doesn't entirely share the above
statement. However, the last part is the most important, and
is in accord with the view we are trying to formulate here.
In the same context, Munsterberg writes?
The real man, it is felt, is not affected by this
differentiation, and it would not be worth while
either to command or to obey if all men did not
tacitly understand that each esteems the other
as an equal. (2 )( Italics mine)
So far the conception has been given the content of indi-
vidual rights, freedom, and equality; ajid yet it has not been
related to the central factor in American values and in the
philosophy of naturalistic humanism. The period when the con-
ception of social democracy became most informed with the belief
in individual growth was perhaps in the second quarter of the
nineteenth century. It is not denied that this aspect was
implicit before then, and was explicitly recognized by some, but
it was during this period that it manifested itself in such
national reforms as the feminist movement, abolition, and the
1. Munsterberg, Hugo, Op. Git
.
, d. 532.




first stirrings of organized labor. V/ith reference to this
period Merle Curti writes that
It conceived of the individual as both end
and means, 'j-'he thoroughly consistent exponents
of democracy widened the circle to include women
and emphasized the individual not only as a final
end but as a means of achieving that end. 'i'hat
end was the full growth and power of the individual,
of every individual; the means by which this was
to be achieved was individual effort, combined with
that of others, to break down all the barriers, be
they tradition, law, or interest, that stood in the
way of elevating every individual in the most depressed
ranSs to full power and glory. (1)
It is interesting to note the contrast between such ex-
pressions as those of Munsterberg and Curti. •'^or though the
former frequently made very penetrating observations into
1
American life, he never was really able to feel it nor did he
ever understand the significance of the one central factor. It
is extremely doubtful that he would have ever been able to de-
tach himself enough from his Germanic origins to experience the
i
significance of "elevating every individual. • .to full power
and glory .
However, even the concept as embodied in Curti *s descrip-
It ion is not sufficient to account for certain modern manifestations
ii
I
which are nevertheless indigenously American, nor has it yet
been so defined as to include the concept of social responsibility.
In order to define it in its individualistic as well as in Its
modern corporate sense, and in order to have it cover such
aspects as family relationships and the role of the modern
1. Curti, Merle, The Growth of American Thought « New York:
Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1945, p> 583
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American woman, we must go further in our effort to give the
term content. And perhaps there is no better authority than
that person whom Professor Whitehead considered "the chief
intellectual force providing the North American environment
with coherent purpose" •••• As expressed by John Dewey, social
democracy is a way of life which recognizes
•••the necessity for the participation of every
mature human being in formation of the values that
regulate the living of men together! which is nec-
essary from the standpoint of both the general
social welfare and the full development of human
beings as individuals, (l)
It will be noted that there are three distinctive aspects
in the modern conception which set it in advance of the earlier
expressions. First, its focus is upon the "formation of the
values" of a particular way of life, which further emphasizes
the content as social rather than sociological. Secondly, it
emphasizes the importance of the "social welfare", whereas
the previous expressions were concerned with only individual
relationships, or at most, individuals conceived of in class
terms, as in the early reform movements* And finally, it
emphasizes the necessity of universal individual "participation"
in the formation of values and in maintaining the social welfare*
Social democracy is no longer merely a matter of individual
freedom, rights, and equality, but now includes the responsi-
bility of the individual to contribute to a way of life. It
puts upon every human being the burden of fulfilling his re-
la Dewey, John, Intelligence in the Modern Wor Id . New York
J
Random House, Inc. » 1959, p« 400»
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sponsilDility to society to the degree most consonant with his
achieved understanding of life. And though there is no desire
to be dogmatic about it, this is to my mind, the most impor-
tant aspect of it, and that which really marks the coming of ag^
of a democratic culture. The concept of social responsibility
;
is not foreign to an aristocratic or authoritarian culture, in
which everyone has a class function, or his function is deter-
mined by the State. But we have already seen that even such a
great mind as Jefferson formulated his conception of democracy
in terms of rights and freedoms. Nor was this conception altered
i
•
by Lincoln when he stated that "The principles of Jefferson are
the definitions and axioms of a free society". Therefore, it
is perhaps not an unwarranted assumption to msdntain that when
a democratic culture is formulated in the terms used by John
Dewey, it has achieved the integration and coherence of a
healthy and mature society. And when this conception is fully
realized and applied, we will then truly be inaugurating "the
century of the common man". For it is in such terms as these
that the "common man" is really meamizuziful : i.e.. that man who
shares the hi;2;hest common denominator of participation in form-
ing the values of a democratic culture.
It was this conception which Herrick had in mind in The
Common Lot, as well as in each of the books we have discussed.
For the "common man" is not the "average guy" of Lewis, nor
"the man in the street" of the side-walk commentators. The
common man may be a college professor or an ice-man, an artist
rc
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or a taxi-driver, depending upon how close the marriage of his
own life activity and the common quality of experience of a
democratic culture---the marriage between individual life pur-
pose and democratic social values.
As mentioned above, this conception is implicit in all
Herrick's works, but it is the "theme" in only one of them* In
The Common Lot , it is made the basis for Herrick's indictment
of the economic system built upon "that beast-tussle to snatch
a dollar that some other man wants to get from youl"(l) For
among other things this system develops the economic and social
class stratification which militates against the individual's
sharing the common core of democratic values, regardless of h3s3
class. It was this which the Idealistic wife of F, Jackson
Hart, the ambitious young architect, had in mind when she per-
ceived that it had prohibited the realization of her
•••efforts to reach that world which lay outside her
own circle. Mor and more, as her married life went
on, she succumbed to the milieu that her husband had
chosen. As his struggle for success grew hotter, she,
too, in her own way, had been absorbed into it, and
had become the domestic and social satellite which he
neafei in his relations with rich clients. (2)
Although Helen Hart is quickly perceptive of the individual
as well as social consequences of a viciously competitive system
her husband is not brought to this realization until after he
has lost all sense of professional ethics and social responsi-
1. Herrick, Robert, The Common Lot » New York. The MacMillan
Co., 1904, p. 38.
2. Ibid, p. 209.
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bility. After a cixmulative aeries of acts involving the evasion
I.
||of building codes, construction with shoddy materials, etc.
Hart is finally responsible for the construction of a hotel in
which many lives are lost due to the lack of safe-giffds against
jrire. Upon his recovery from the immediate shock,
'^he catastrophe which had shaken him to the roots of his
being sank into its place behind the long procession of
those acts, which had made him what he was. Now, at
last, he began to think coherently, to see himself in
the whole of his being, step by step, as he had come to
be. (1)
It is then that he understands the significance of those
acts in terms of personal demoralization and social deteriora-
||bion« And it is then that he recognizes the necessity for in-
dividual responsibility in combating a destructive competitive
system; and in so doing he rejects amore remunerative offer
and takes a job as draughtsman, in order to "join the ranks, to
work for the work's sake, to bear the common lot, which is to
live humbly and labor (2)
It is the same sense of social responsibility which Herrick
reaffirms in the person of Beckwith, as previously discussed in
relation to his dedication to the cause of labor, pacificism,
and the responsibility of the teacher to integrate the academic
world with life in general, (cf . pp. 30, 50-51)
One can arrive at Lewis's conception of social responsi-
jjjility only by indirection, for he doesn't consider it in terms
which are binding upon all individuals, regardless of position
1. ibid, p, 337.
2. Ibid, p. 402.
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In life, or economic or educational status. His closest approach
is in terms of professional integrity, and that has specific
connotations which will be developed later.(cf . pp» 112-116)
However, it is rather clear that he doesn't believe it has much
'applicability to American life, or that it is symptomatic of
American culture, ^he first mentioned aspect is made explicit
in the words of Dr. Gottlieb, the world renowned scientist in
^Arrowsmith , who states that "The normal man, he does not care
much what he does except that he should eat and sleep and make
love".(l) As Emerson would say, that is the life of a normal
muskrat, not a normal man.
The complete infeasibility of an applied social responsi-
bility as a mode of behavior is made clear in the fate of
^^Babbitt, Although it is true that his brief revolution against
the group customs and mores consisted in part of moral behavior
not especially becoming to a settled family-man of the middle-
class, the main pressure against him was due to his brief and
half-hearted support of Seneca Doane and the rights of labor.
In this he was showing the highest measure of social responsi-
bility he ever achieved. As to the outcome of any overt mani-
festation of social responsibility:
He felt that he had been trapped into the very net
from which he had with such fury escaped and, sup-
remest jest of all, had been made to rejoice in the
trappings • "They've licked me; licked me to a finish!" (2)
(Italics mine
)
'l. Lewis, Sinclair, Op. Cit. , p. 290.




The obvious implication of the italicized portion is that
the individual rejoices in being forced to reject all responsi-
bility to life. It cannot be denied that many individuals
attain a greater sense of security in rejecting rather than
asserting their responsibility. However, the effect of the
total drift of Lewis's work is to imply that no one can suc-
cessfully maintain his own integrity and responsibility to a
clarification of the life about him# Not only is such a pre-
sentation not symptomatic of hurrian experience in the large;
but, in the absence of implications toward how a responsible
attitude to life could be achieved, such a presentation womld
not be a contribution to human understanding even if it were
acciarate. And at the same session of self-searching:
He indignantly told the Tempter that he was content to
do things in the good old-fashioned way. 'j-'he day after,
he went to see the purchasing- agent of the Street Trac-
tion Company and they made plans for the secret purchase
of lots along Evanston Road, But as he drove to his
office he struggled, "I'm going to run things and figure
out things to suit myself when I retire". (1)
A second aspect of social democracy, and that most common-
ly associated with it, is the conception of social equality.
The historical formulation of this aspect has already be consid-l
ered in relation to the discussion of the more inclusive term
with which this chapter was initiated. Consequently, the focus
will be upon the modern conception most congruent with the total
context of this paper. Social equality means, therefore, the
equal right for all mature individuals to share in the formu-
1. Ibid, p. 398.
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lation of the basic values of the American culture in every
area of experience, it might be argued that this aspect should
|
precede that of social responsibility, for certainly, if an
individual is not granted the right he can hardly have any
responsibility. However, in operation the two are contempora-
neous with one another rather than one emerging from the other. \
And in any event, we will come out at the same place, and that
is the important thing; for it is the fruits and not the roots
of a method which count •
Perhaps the most important phase of social equality, and
certainly the most widely considered, is that of racial equality.
And although this aspect will not be considered in detail in
the present discussion, it is not because the writer wishes to
avoid a recognition of the undemocratic features of American
civilization. On the contrary, there are several reasons for
this, which are important enough in themselves to warrant some
discussion
•
The first reason is that this subject was not a very signi-
ficant part of the frame of reference of either of the authors
under discussion. Of course, Lewis wrote Kingsblood ^oval .
but that was a work of such bare theatricality even for him
that it is not worthy of discussion, 'he second reason is one
which applies largely to Herrick and which also has application
to the problem of functional literature in general. In this
respect, the reference is to the distinction between social and
sociological literature. Because Herrick was a social critic.
(i
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concerned with the formulation and realization of basic social
values, he did not concern himself with the "Negro problem",
the Negro simply not being part of the world where those values
were being formed. Had he brought this aspect of American civi-
lization into the scope of this work in the context that his
stories took place, it would have been a meretricious device
to capitalize on a sociological problem.
With regard to the application of this distinction to the
general field of contemporary American literature, it can be
said that the works which treat racial equality as an issue
of social significance rather than as a sociological problem
can almost be counted on the fingers of one hand. In this
group can be included the later works of Ellen Glasgow (the
only ones in which it had a proper place at all). Strange Fruit
(with certain qualifications), and Of Mice and i^Ien ; and with
regard to the last it should be recorded that Steinbeck does
more in half a dozen pages with the symbol of the crippled negro,
'^Crooks", than is done in a carload of pot-boilers like Kings-
blood Royal . There are probably other works than these which
are just as significant, but if so, the writer either has not
read them or they do not readily come to mind. But at any rate,
these are sufficient to illustrate the difference between social
and sociological treatment of racial equality*
'^aving dispensed with the conception of racial equality,
we will consider social equality in terms of the individual,
irrespective of race, (as it will be if and when the ideal of
r
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racial equality is realized).
It was previously stated that social equality was the re-
cognition of the equal right of every mature individual to
participation in the formation of the basic social values.
Insofar as these values are formed and formulated through their
realization in experience this also means the right to achieve
individual excellence in living, -^or when these values are
realized the individual is brought into contact with the ele-
mental realities of life in a democratic society. Such a view
was at the core of Jefferson*s statement to John Adams when he
wrote! "I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy
among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents." (l)
As Jefferson conceived of these terms, virtue means, in its
"broadest connotations, a highly developed sense of discrimina-
tion in evaluative behavior; similarly, talents are, in the
same context, the achieved aptitudes conducive to a cumulatively
harmonic adjustment in living, '^he writer obviously does not
share the narrow conception of aptitude maintained by the voca-
tional guidance "experts", as an innate predisposition toward
mechanical efficiency in handling blocks, filing cards, or
mathematical symbols. The most important aptitudes, as yet
incapable of being measured by present methods, are achieved
in the process of a cumulative realization of the meaning of
life. This is not mysticism, but a recognition of the fullness
1* Jefferson, Thomas, Jefferson's Letters . Eau Clair, V/isc.s




""•he intimate and interpenetrating relationship among the
basic American values is apparent when one considers the fore-
going in relation to intellectual democracy and the American
jbelief in the "practicality" of education, for in the final
analysis the only really practical education is the "leading
out" of the student's potentialities into an achieved awareness
of the meaning of life in a particular culture. It is on the
basis of this conception that D.W. Brogan seeks to justify the
American educational system to his British readers, when he
writes that
The political function of the schools is to teach
Americanism, meaning not merely political and pa-
triotic dogma, but the habits necessary to American
life.d)
Perhaps the term "habits" is not the most appropriate to
the present context, but the meaning of his sentence is clear.
Herrick comes closer to the present meaning of education in a
social democracy when he refers to the rise in women's education!
Unconsciously they sought something more than information,
something, as i<irs. Crandall would put it, that they might
work directly into their own lives ... .They were seeking
for something wit)i which to enlarge their consciousness
of life, and wherever they found it, they responded
quickly
. (2)
Of course, Herrick might be disappointed today if he saw
the modern co-ed who feels herself undressed without her knitting:
1. Brogan, D.W., The American Character ^ New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1944,p. 136.




bag, and perhaps the movement of co-education has gone too far.
However, that does not negate the validity of the relationship
presented above; that is a problem of the mechanics of adraini-
stration> and the professors who can stimulate the growth of
an enlarged consciousness---it is not a problem of social values
Enough previous discussion has been given to Herrick's treat-
ment of social responsibility to indicate that his clarification
of social equality would be essentially the same. Consequently,
it will be more illuminating for our purposes to consider Lewis's
"clarification" of the opposite side of the coin. Actually,
there are two distinct aspects which frequently emerge as dis-
tortions of the ideal of social equality. One is the indis-
criminate acceptance of anyone, regardless of elements of personal
merit or demerit, insofar as he remains fairly well within the
boundaries of the law. This is, of course, a complete negation
of social democracy, if the term has any significance in relatioji
to an achieved awareness of the meaning of democratic values.
For in the failure to discriminate in matters of individual
worth, the process of evaluation of the individual is blocked*
And this in turn, both directly and indirectly, blocks the
achievement of individual development through the inhibition
of opportunity as well as incentive. This aspect was referred
to by Munsterberg when he stated that
The essential weakness of such a democracy is rather
the importance it assigns to the average man with his
petty opinions, which are sometimes right and some-
times wrong, his total lack of comprehension for all
that is great and exceptional, his self-satisfied
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dilet tanteism and his complacency before the
accredited and trite in thought, (l)
As an interpretation of historical fact there is much that
is true in this statement. As a theory of social democracy,
however, there are several glaring misconceptions?. I'he first
is Munsterberg' s use of the term "essential", which, judging
from the total context of his thought, is used in its philo-
sophic connotations. And to the American democrat, and in the
view presented in this paper, there is no weakness in the
essence of democracy. There is in fact, no such thing as the
essence of democracy in the philosophic sense; for democracy
Is not an ai)stract ideal inhabited by a ghostly essence which
is implicit in the expression by Munsterberg* Rather, democracy
is a quality of experience achieved in the realized relation-
ships among human beings. And as those relationships are in
constant process so is the democratic quality of experience.
There are, therefore, no weaknesses of democracy which cannot
be overcome by a co-operative application of the accumulated
social intelligence to the problems of human relations.
Another error of Munsterberg' s is his use of the term
"average man", a static mathematical abstraction of the lowest
common denominator in a democratic culture. Vife prefer the term
**common man", which implies the highest common denominator and
which assumes a potentiality of growth, which Munsterberg'
s






Finally, and most important, is the error involved in the
thesis of his entire argument, which if read carefully, implies
a stability of social equilibrium which denies all change. To
deny all that is "great and exceptional", to be "self-satisfied"!,
and to be complacent "before the accredited and trite in thought",
is to be incapable of growth. And regardless of one's opinion
of the present state of American culture, there is no denying
the fact that there has been considerable extension in the
application of the democratic values, '^hla statement has been
treated in such detail because it represents a similar belief
held by Mr. Lewis. It is the basis for his characterizing the
* aver age man" of America as an indiscf iminating boob, incapable
of distinguishing between the specious and the real, the mere-
tricious and the worthy, or even the stupid and the intelligent.
This is adequately illustrated in the reaction to the creations
of T. Cholmondeley Frimk, "a Famous Poet and a distinguished-
advertising-agent", who is not backward in entertaining his
friends with his latest artistic effort. At one of Babbitt's
parties he illustrates his esthetic "principles":
So I decided to stick to the straight poetic, and I
took a shot at a highbrow ad for the Zeeco . How do
you like this:
The long white trail is calling calling and it's
over the hills and far away for every man and woman
that has red blood in his veins and on his lips the
ancient song of the buccaneers. . .This great new truth
the makers of the Zeeco Car have considered. . .It ' s fleet
as the antelope, smooth as the glide of a swallow, yet
powerful as the charge of a bull-elephant •Life '
s
ZIPPINGEST ZEST THE ZEECO i.,.
f
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The whole company sighed with sympathy and admirat ion . (l
)
Once again Mr. Lewis presents a composite type, T. Cholraondeley
Frink, being a combination of Eddie Guest, ^^^orton Dovmey, and
the writers of advertizing blurbs. And onee again such an out-
landish burlesque fails as social criticism because it is not
symptomatic of the best, nor even the representative, in Ameri-
can art, and is consequently not an index to the limitations of
the American cultural pattern.
The same lack of discrimination in the area of personal
worth is presented in Arrowsmith » when Dr. Gottlieb is fired
from Winnemac because he opposes the frauds and salesmen in
medicine, (2 ) when Arrowsmith fails in his private practice and
as health officer of Wheat sylvania because of popular pressure
against him; (3) when he fails as health officer of Nautilus (4)
for the same reason; and when he feels constrained to resign
at the McGurk Institute(5) rather than be forced into the
publicity job of president. In each instance it is a matter of
the good, the dedicated, and the worthy individual sacrificed
to the unintelligent lack of discrimination of the public.
The other aspect of a distorted form of social equality
is that which emerges from the lack of discrimination, as social
conformity and uniformity of thought. It might be mentioned
parenthetically that both the phrases are in direct contravention
1. Lewis, Sinclair, Op. Git
.
, p. 118.
2. Lewis, Sinclair, Op . Gjt
,
, p. 143.
3. Ibid, p. 197.
4. Ibid
, p. 297.
5. Ibid, p. 459.
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of the traditional American ideal of non-conformity, which will
be discussed later. (cf. pp. 127-129) However, this aspect
does exist to a certain extent , (though, once again this is a
superficial characteristic) and a number of foreign observers
have remarked about it, i-iatthew Arnold's greatest complaint
against American civilization was that it was not int erest ing
(Italics given), which he considered the true index of civili-
zation:
•••what human nature, I say, demands in civilisation,
if it is to stand as a high and satisfying civilization,
is best described by the word interesting .
.
•
Now the best sources of the interest ing are distinction
and beauty; that which is elevated, and that which
is beaut iful. (1)
Emerson would hardly agree that this is the real mark of
civilization, nor, I believe would many Americans, except per-
haps T.S, Eliot and his devotees. However, Arnold was not the
only one who noticed this aspect. Edward Dicey remarked that
Everybody, as a rule, holds the same opinions about
everything, and expresses his views more or less, in
the same language. These views are often correct,
almost invariably intelligent and creditable to the
holders, i^ut still, even at the risk of hearing para-
doxes defended, you cannot help wishing, at times, for
a little more of originality. ^2)
However, D.W. Erogan, in his Preface to The Amer ic an
Character, wrote: "My object has been to make what 1 think
is the most interesting country in the world interesting and
intelligible to others". (3) And Harriet Martineau observed
1. Gommager, Henry Steele, Op. Git
.
, p. 133.
2. Ibid, p. 129.




The Americans appear to me an eminently Imaginative
people. At a distance it is seen clearly enough that
they do not put their imaginative power to use in
literature and the arts«.«(l)
But after remarking that the American imagination was
applied to commerce and politics, she stated that when popula-
tion increased and American society reached a higher degree of
complexity, that
•••the pursuit of literature, philosophy, and art
shall become as definitely the business of some men
as politics and commerce now are of others. ..and that
a plenitude of power will be shed into these depart-
ment s •( 2 )
Even so, there is undoubtedly a tendency toward uniformity
of thought and social conformity, (as there very likely is in
every society) in spite of the fact that both are implicit con-
tradictions of the American value system. And since these two
forces operate so strongly against a realization of American
values it is worth while to consider how effectively they were
handled by Lewis and Herrick. In referring to Babbitt's un-
easiness in answering his son's question of why he had to study
Shakespeare in school, Lewis writes that
Neither the Advocate-Times , the Evening Advocate , nor
the Bulletin of the Zenith Chamber of Commerce had
ever had an editorial on the matter, and until one of
them had spoken he found it hard to form an original
opinion. (3)
And among the details of Lewis's description of Babbitt's
1* Commager, Henry Steele, Op. Cit
.
, p. 67.
2. Loc .cit .





•••a blue velvet davenport faced the fireplace, and
behind It was a cherrjwood table and a tall piano-
lamp with a shade of golden silk. •(Two out of every
three houses in Floral Heights had cefore the fire-
place a davenport, a mahogany table real or imitation)
...In a corner by the front windows was a large
cabinet Victrola. (Eight out of every nine Floral
Heights houses had a cabinet phonograph)
•
Anong the pictures, hung in the exact center of each
gray panel, were a red and black imitation English
hunting-print, an anemic imitation boudoir-print
with a French caption. . .(Nineteen out of avery twenty
houses in Floral Heights had either a hunting-print
a Madame Fait la Toilette pr int ) . • • ( 1
)
Once again, in applying the test question of ''V^hat are
the possibilities and potentialities of a cultural pattern?"
It is apparent that Lewis does not make a very serious indict-
ment of the limitations of American life. It has already been
pointed out that Babbitt is not symptomatic of American life,
because he is a composite of all its worst features; conse-
quently, one is not alarmed at the fact that he cannot form
an opinion unaided by the daily editorial. Also, it might be
added that the recent presidential election Illustrated that
on occasion even the "average guy" has opinions other than
those that sire mass produced by the American press. And with
regard to the uniformity of the decor of the houses in Floral
Heights, it is apparent that Lewis's focus is not upon a cultural.
pattern but upon the mere artifacts of a culture. It is
another illustration of the limitation of his method of focusing
upon the surface of existence.
1. Ibid , p. 91-92.
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The same purpose is achieved with a great deal more significance
by Herri ck in The End of Desire * While at a luncheon of dis-
tinguished and cultivated easterners, Serena i^iassey, the
"brittle" psychologist, desires to test their reactions to the
question of the administration of the Sacco and Vanzetti trial.
In each instance-—the headmaster of an expensive boys' academy,
the Bishop-Coadjutor of i'^orthern Michigan, the Secretary of
State of the United States, a noted lawyer, a Back Bay matron
etc.-—the individual expresses the opinion that the prisoners
should be dispatched without further delay. Finally, one of
them states that
"•••what is of more importance from my viewpoint
than the lives of these two dagoes, whether guilty
or not, is the harm that agitation of the case has
done our institutions, i'he sooner we get rid of this
agitation the better i".(l)
Later, Redfield, the "civilized man", reflects upon the
•••carefully dressed men and women, with excellent
manners, representative and distinguished Americans,
who on most essential matters thought alike and
acted alike, all from the highest motlvesl • • • (2)
Here the writer has presented a valid indictment of the
limitations of our cultural pattern, ^'or he has gathered, in
a thoroughly plausible situation, representatives of the most
learned and cultivated class, each of whom parrots the same
basic idea. And it should further be added, inasmuch as there
is not space to illustrate it, that they are not burlesqued or
!• Kerrick, Robert, The End of Desire , New York: Farrar &
Rinehart, Inc., 1952, p. 205
•
2. Ibid , p. 208,
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dehumanized. As the author stated, their opinions sprang from
the highest motives; and that is the real tragedy of an educa-
tive process (not just formal education, of course) which does
not equip the raemters of its society to deal adequately with
the elements of each individual situation in which the issue
of value is concerned.
Another aspect of how a given cultural pattern may preclude
Individuality of thought and expression, and perhaps a really
more significant aspect, is presented "by Herrick's treatment
of the gentlemen's cluh. On returning from a South American
trip with Serena wlassey, Redfield is oppressed with the same-
ness and the sterility of imagination of his fellow clubmens
God I How many bald and gray heads i how many dull
faces 1 -"Odern living might keep men young in feeling,
but it took from them all di?3tinction of feature...
And all seemed to have the same decorous mental tone,
slightly subdued and monotonous, that went with the
restrained voices...
They too might be concealing beneath the stream of
chitchat and commonplace the same torturing and
tumultous emotions he felt, the same bewildering
alternations of emotions he felt •••sines he had
become Serena Massay's lover. V^ere they, perhaps
some of them at least—-carrying a double train
of consciousness, exchanging trite remarks on the
English coal strike while listening intently for
the telephone in the hall to ring and a soft negro
voice to whisper over the shoulder • ••(l)
As will be noted, ^ierrick again uses the only really valid
index to a culture, that is, the most highly educated and deve-
loped members of a praticular society, not a composite buffoon.
Only passing mention has heretofore been given to a phase
1. £bld, p. 13.
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of American social equality which, if not the most important,
is certainly its most distinctive feature* That is sexual
equality, an element of the American value system which per-
vades the entire fabric of American life. The present role
of the American woman is recognized as having its roots in the
American past, the colonial women having early achieved a posi-
tion peculiar to the New Vi/orld as a result of the shortage of
their sex. Equal status between the sexes and an expansion of
the role of women was further increased in the development of
the frontier. Of course, for a long time that role was one in
which the female population was systematically decimated by a
too heavy burden of child-bearing. But that was only one aspect
of their role as the source of continuity of the race as well
as the culture.
Josiah Royce noted this second factor in his study of the
California mining camps of the gold rush. He considered as
two of the major factors in the personal demoralization and
social disorganization of the mining camps, the lack of women,
and the fact that many of the men expected to make a rich
strike and return home.(l) In this respect the mining frontier
was really an aberration of the normal frontier process, in
which woman occupied a vital role and shared all the dangers
and hardships of the man, and many which did not directly
touch him. In his discussion of what might be called the Spic
1. Royce, Josiah, California
.
A Study of American Character ,
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, p. 182, 216, 217.
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American Woman, D.W, Brogan, remarks upon the conditions of
her life, ana her function as a civilizing forces
It was a hard world for the men; it was a far
harder world for the women...For all the elements
of a woman* 3 life had to be created; the home had
to be built, the settled community life had to be
created; the possibility of a non-savage life
for the children had to be made out of nothing.
It was on the women, confined to the cabin, that the
worst hardships fell. They died of plagues like the
milk-sick; their children died of it. They died
in childbed; It was the women who suffered from the
laxity of the marriage bond. . .footloose husband or
lover. . .savage feuds. ..the shiftles-^ness of the man.
It was Lincoln's stepmother who encouraged him to
read, who gave him his first glimpse of civilisation
••.It was Lincoln's wife...who tried to make a tidy,
socially ambitious man out of the frontier lawyer. (l)
Sexual equality as an ideal is to be understood in relatior
to two major areas of experience; first, the movement for
woman's independence and an equal share in the formation of
values in whatever area of life is chosen for self-realization;
and second, sexual equality in marital and family relations.
In dealing with both these aspects Herrick's deep sense of
American history and the traditional frontier role of woman
comes into operation more than in almost any other aspect of his
work. For the clarification of the role of the truly modern
American woman, and the meaning of marital relationships, are
part of the core of his entire perspective. Nowhere is his
Indictment of American life more bitter than in the sgeciousnesa
of many of the feminist movements of his time, and the±r op-
posite number, the great American export item of the late nine-





teenth and early twentieth century, known as the American Beauty*
JMohody realized more than did Herrick that much of what
was parading as the struggle for women *s Independence was In
reality nothing more than a manifestation of the irresponsi-
bility of pampered, bored, and neurotic women. He realized
that a large measure of the furore to "live their own lives"
and "live life at its fullest" was the result of women who had
rejected the traditional role of Woman, and had achieved no
responsible function to fill its place. In the case of Isabelle
Lane, whose illness was diagnosed as "anemia and nervous debility"
the doctors decided after her first child that
the wife should remain sterile, and the physicians
undertook to watch over the life process, to guard
against its asserting its rights.
...The simple old tale that a man and a woman loving
each other marry and have children that live within
them and come from their mutual love has been rewritten
for the higher classes of American women, with the aid
of science. Health, economic pressure, the hectic
struggle to survive in an ambitious world have altered
the simple axioms of nature. (1)
V»hen Isabelle is finally brought to face the facts of her
life she
saw her ambitions shrivel into petty nothings,-— all
the desires from her first married days to find a
suitable expression of her individuality, her wish
to escape Torso, her contempt for St. Louis, •••her
seeking for "interesting" people •••and last of all her
dissatisfaction in her marriage»(2)
However, Herrick realized that the modern woman, in order
to achieve a valid sexual equality, must assume the responsi-
1. Herrick, ^bert. Together, New York: The MacMillan Co.,
1908, p^ 157.
2. Ibid, p> 499.
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billty toward the formation of values in her area of life,
whether as a career woman or in marriage. In the former case,
it is not the brittle Jessica Mallorys and Serena iMasseys,
jealously guarding their "individuality" and "privacy", who
are the symbols of sexual equality. Rather, it is such women
as Mrs. Grandall, the Dean of Women, at Eureka University, who
More than any one of her t irae. • .embodied the ideal of
equality in educational opportunities and therefore
in life— -for men and women. She had never taken part
in the political struggle for woman's emancipation.
"Let us become better, richer human beings", she had
proclaimed insistently, "and all other privileges will
be ours. But first we must prove our abilities on
men's ground through the discipline of our minds", (l)
And yet, to achieve sexual equality, the woman need not
abandon her sex; for unless she becomes a complete and rounded
Individual, not the brittle machine of Jessica Mallory, the
achievement is without value in terms of a fulfilled life pur-
pose. In this sense also Herrick symbolizes a full and rounded
sexual equality in the person of Edith Grandall; for
Here was a woman, all woman, .. .whose marriage had
obviously been happy, and yet she had yielded not-
hing of her individual gifts to the accident of
having been born a woman. When she died the signi-
ficance of her courageous example had already been
absorbed into American ideas: a girl was no longer
considered peculiar or fit only for the convent be-
cause she chose to go to college liKe her brothers. (2)
Lewis's conception of an achieved sexual equality, and the
feasibility of woman's sharing in the formation of values out-
1. Herrick, Robert, chimes > New York: 'I'he MacMillar ^o, 1926,
84.
2. Ibid, p. 85.
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side the marriage, is perhaps best illustrated in the person of
Carol Kennicott of Main Street » '-^'here is no need to go into
detail, because this is another instance of that now familiar
aspect of his work in rejecting the role of intelligence. This
particular work might be considered a study in the stupidity of
any one who attempts to lessen the stupidity of others. After
Carol has been defeated by Gopher Prairie, as Babbitt, and
Arrowsmith and Gottlieb, and ^aul Riesling are each beaten by
the mass stupidity of their respective environments, she remarks
that though she was defeated,
I have won in this: I've never excused my failures by
sneering at my aspirations, by pretending to have gone
beyond them. I do not admit that Main Street is as
beautiful as it should be! I do not admit that Gopher
Prairie is greater or more generous than Europe I I
do not admit that dish-washing is enough to satisfy all
women! I may not have fought the good fight, but I
have kept the faith.
"Sure. You bet you have", said Kennicott. "Well, good
night. Sort of feels to me like it might snow tomorrow.
Have to be thinking about putting up the storm-windows
pretty soon. Say, did you notice whether the girl
put that screwdriver back?"(l)
It is a slight digression, but a warranted one, to mention
that this is typical of the Lewis-Munst erberg denial of growth
in the concept of the "average man". It is also indicative of
Mr. Lewis's inverted romanticism, for the ending of each of his
books under consideration here is essentially the same. In each
one it consists of a melodramatic assertion of a blind, purpose-
less staggering of humanity in a midnight world unilluminated
1. Lewis, Sinclair, Main street . New York: Harcourt Brace <Sc
Co., 1920, p. 451.
I
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by intelligence. V^itness the endings of Babbitt, Arrowssiith ,
and It Can 't Happen Here, in that order: the first is the Lewis
version of Polonius to Laertes, as Babbitt sends his son into
the world:
"Well, those folks in there will try to bully you,
and tame you down. Tell 'em to go to the devil
i
I'll back you., .Don't be scared of the family. No,
nor all of Zenith. Nor of yourself, the way I've been.
G-o ahead old man! The world is yours! "
Arms about each other's shoulders, the Babbitt men
marched into the living-room and faced the swooping
family. (1)
And Martin Arrowsmith to Terry V/ickett in their primitive
laboratory in the north woods:
I feel as if I were really beginning to work now...
This new quinine stuff may prove pretty good. We'll
plug it for two or three years, and maybe we'll get
something permanent—-and probably we'll fail!" (2)
And the gallant Doremus Jessup of the counter-revolutionary
underground:
So Doremus rode out, saluted by the meadow larks, and
onward all day, to a hidden cabin in the Northern
Woods where quiet men awaited news of freedom.
And still Doremus goes on in the red simrise, for a
Doremus ties sup can never die. (3)
Although not usually considered characteristic of Lewis's
works, the above romanticized glorification of human purposive-
ness is an inevitable result of the author's philosophic and
artistic perspectives. For, due to his exclusive concern for
the mere facts of existence and his consequent lack of under-
1. Lewis, Sinclair, Op. Cit
.
, p. 401.
2. Lewis, Sinclair, Cit
. p. 464.
3. Lewis, Sinclair, Op. Cit p. 458.
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standing of the meaning of American life, Lewis is left without
an adequate explanation of the source of its vitality. Hence,
his only recourse is to adopt the conception of man as heing
motivated by some blind animalistic urge to survival. Such a
view is due to a superficial and misconceived notion of the
meaning of naturalistic philosophy. And, as in all writing in
which an author deals with ideas he is intellectually incapable
of handling, the presentation results in an aborative effort to
express the emotion attendant upon the idea, the result being
lush sentimentality.
'^o return to the discussion on sexual equality, however,
and this time as it is manifested in marital relations. '-Che
same principle applies, of course, in this area as in all areas
of social equality, specifically, the right for the woman to
participate on an equal basis in the mutual formation and
pedlization of marital values, '-^'his means a mutual sharing
in the realization of value in a cooperative relationship, such
a relationship being a union of complements in working toward a
sommon goal. Such a relationship is symbolized in the title of
derrick's work. Together , which, to get the full implication of
what he considered the ideal marital relationship, must be taken
Ln the strick etymological sense of the word.
Herrick does not, of course, put the full burden of respon-
sibility for this sort of relationship upon the woman. In large
ineasure, because an urban-industrial life has taizen so many tra-
ditional functions of the family away from it education.
r(
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amusement, family enterprise everything practically, but
|
procreation, it has deprived the relationship of that quality
of struggling for a comron goal, Mvhich was characteristic of
I
I
the early American marriage. It has been deprived of the sense
of togetherness, a condition which is intensified by the se-
I'paratlon of the husband's ecionomic activity from his marital
1
[activity. Urban existence, has, in short, violated the organic
unity of man's life in segregating the area of -work from the
area of the family, as well as such areas as self-expression,
creativity, etc. The result has been to further the alienation
;of husband and wife in shutting her out from at least half of
his conscious life. Herrick's historical perspective once again
I
functions, as well as his philosophy of naturalism, in clarifying
i
!the meaning of marriage and sexual equality. In a chapter in
which he traces American history in terms of the altering
structure of the family, he alludes to the frontier marriage
as the ideal:
• ••the marriage type of the pioneer-— a primitive,
body-wracking struggle of two against all, a perfect
type, elemental but v^hole,—-and this remains the
large pattern of marriage today wherever sound. Two
bodies, two souls are united for the life struggle
to wring order out of chaos, ---physical and spiritual. ( l)
Tne pattern of final realization in Together is much the
same as that previously mentioned, in The Common Lot, although
in the former instance the author's focus is more upon the





marital relationship itself and. the revivification of the neu-
rotic modern woman. In both, however, the protagonists operate
in an urban- industrial world which inhibits a full realization
of the self in relation to marital values. Such realization
does not come until the neurotic Isabelle Lane overcomes the
"curse of egotism" through the therapy of work, objectified
activity and the achievement of a sense of social responsibi-
lity. With that she returns to her husband who has recently
been put up as the sacrificial goat by the trustees of his
railroad, when fast trading practices are unearthed to the
public. The pattern is repeated also in that after acquittal,
the Lanes, like the Harts of The Common Lot , assume the personal
responsibility to their own integrity in rejecting a remunera-
tive offer which promises possibility of a reversion to the old
life. But while The Common Lot emphasized the social responsi-
bility of the "common man", the Lanes follow the historic Ameri|^
can pattern of going west, and in the consciousness of their
role, are sensitized to the corporate awareness of the "civili-
zed man". Isabelle, in her identification with the traditional
role of the American woman in a new land, had
•.•the conviction that each one counted, had his own
terrestrial struggle, his own celestial drama, dif-
fering very little in importance from his neighbor's;
each one-—man, woman, or child---in all the wonderful
completeness of life throughout the millions •• •here
where the race was sowing new land.(l) (Italics given)
1. Ibid, p. 591.
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It is then that they both realize the meaning of equality
and unity in marriage, when
The appeal that had never been wholly stifled in the
man still beat in his pulses for the womsm. And the
appeal never wholly roused in the woman by him reached
out now for him; but an appeal not merely of the
senses. .an appeal, limitless, of comradeship, pur-
pose, wills. (1)
We have already seen v/hat marriage did to ^'irs. Babbitt,
(cf.p. 22) in considering Lewises descriptive technique. How-
ever, Lewis began to "soften-up" toward both of them near the
end when he apparently decided that Babbitt was a pretty fine
fellow after all. At this point, when Babbitt was at the bot-
tom of the pit, in his marital relations as well as his relations
with the town, Mrs. Babbitt conveniently had an emergency appen^-
dectomy, and as she came out of the operating, room. Babbitt
realized that
...she was not merely A VVomah, to be contrasted with
other women, but his own self, and though he might
criticize her and nag her, it was only as he might
criticize and nag himself, interestedly, unpatroni-
zingly, without the expectation of changing—-or any
real desire to change the eternal essence. (2)
It is amazing how Lewis manages to reveal as many inade-
quacies as he does in such a short passage. He is apparently
reaffirming the basic unity in the marriage of the Babbitts,
forgetting for the moment that "no one, save perhaps Tinka her
ten-year-old, was at all interested in her or entirely aware
that she was alive" . ( cf .p. 22) One wonders how she became part
1. Ibid , p. 588.
2. Lewis, Sinclair, Ojq^ Git p. 383.
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of Babbitt's "own self" by osmosis? There Is not, in the en-
tire book, any conception of a rr:utually shared life, and even
when Babbitt does conceive of his marriage in terms of the
unity, it is important to note that it is only in terms of the
imity of his self. There is no mutual realization of selves,
nor any mutual realization of the meaning of their marriage, if
indeed, it had any» But perhaps this is being too hard on Mr.
Lewis.
It was earlier remarked that Leora Arrowsmith was one of
his few sympathetically created characters. And yet, even
here, Lewis's deep-seated anti-feminism comes through; for try
though he does, he cannot conceive of women on equal terms with
men in any area of life. This is first apparent when Arrow-
smith solves the dilemma of being engaged to two women at once,
by introducing them, like any good honest dumb American, and
"laying his cards on the table". When true blue Leora stands
by him, she remarks J
Perhaps you like me better because you can bully
me—-because I tag after you and She never would...
But 1 am stupid and ordinary and She isn't. I
simply admire you frightfully. • .while She has
sense enough to make you admire Her and tag after
Her.(l)
Apparently, though, and in spite of Leora' s faults, Lewis
wanted to have their marriage built on the solid foundation of
cooperative enterprise, her share of it usually being to wait




up for Martin all night when he is busy experimenting. How-
ever, on occasion her part is more active, as when she aided
him at his experiments while health officer in Nautilus:
"Leora, frowning placidly , the tip of her tongue at the corner
of her mouth, guarded the temperature like a good little watch-
dog " . ( 1) ( Italics mine) It should be noted that although Lewis
apparently wishes to portray Leora as rather "quaint" and elfin-
like, he is, on the whole, serious in depicting this as a sound
marriage based on a unity achieved in a common struggle. The
fact that Arrowsmith becomes enamored with any woman who gives
him a tumble leaves the reader with certain doubts. However, this
too is accounted for, by that grand male institution of the
double- st andard
:
Lee, sweet, can't you see, idiot, if I skipped roxmd
the corner with seventeen billion orchids, it'd be
you I loved, and never anybody but youi (2)
That is what is euphemistically called "spiritual fidelity"
I believe. Insofar as Lewis has no conception of the individual
as an integrated and coherent structure of being, perhaps it
seems feasible to him that one can neatly compartmentalize one's
marital and extra-marit al relations without having them conflict
I
or Interact. True, this is done in other cultures, but on the
'basis of entirely different conception of the marital values
from that held in America.
In short, Lewis's conception of the ideal marriage is one
1. Ibid , p. 186.
2. Ibid , p. 216.
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in which the wife takes the place of a prize setter, always
there, always faithful, and the mutual relationship "being that
of her fetching and carrying for the exculsive benefit of the
Isenevolent master J
Leora was await ing-—Leora whose fate it was ever
to wait for him in creaky rocking-chairs in cheapish
rooms. As he galloped in she smiled, and all her
thin, sweet body was illuminated . (l)
One can practically see her frisking around at his heels.
As an index of how meaningful was Leora 's marriage in terras
of individuated development, the author remarks that she was
frail child, only up to one's shoulder, not nine minutes
older than at marriage, nine years before", (2) Certainly, some-
thing should have been experienced in nine years, if nothing
more than regression.
It should be apparent that all of this emerges from the
basic limitations of Lewis set forth at the beginning, that is,
his complete incapability of being able to conceive of intelli-
jgence in human experience. And it is nowhere more apparent than
in his "characterization" of Leora as the Ideal .voman. ^'or she
is the first character mentioned who has not been the product
Df the author's device of composite types. «Vhen he abandoned
that device in his treatment, of Leora, he was forced to rely
on his own creative powers, such powers requiring genuine insight
Into the process and meaning of human experience. The following
!• Ibid , p. 292.
2. Ibid, p. 311.
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is, in itself, an adequate illustration of the depth of Mr.
Lewis's insight:
When Leora received the idea that he was going off
to a death-haunted isle, ...she took the notion
secretively away with her, to look at it and examine
it, precisely as she often stole little foods from
the table and hid them and meditatively ate them
at odd hours of the night, with the pleased ex-
pression of a had child. (l)
As a derivative value emerging from the concept of sexual
equality, perhaps mention should also be made of the parent-
child relationship in the American family; for the latter is
Important in its relation to individualism as well as the whole
structure of American values. However, in the interest of limi-|
ited space the writer is going to forego a detailed consideration^
of this aspect. It is sufficient to mention that in the develop^
ment of sexual equality, the patriarchical and authoritarian
I
family relationship became obsolescent. ¥»hen the American demo-
cratic family structure is in a state of equilibrium with the
realization of the other American values previously considered,
such a relationship furthers an integrated realization of the
self* However, when it emerges in the extreme form of pseudo-
•
modern egalit arianism in the family, and unmitigated irresponsi-
bility in children it is, of course, a negation of social and
intellectual democracy and a rejection of social and intellectual
Responsibility. Both m.anif est at ions are clarified by Herrick;
and the latter aspect of social and intellectual irresponsibilit;
1. Ibid, p. 364.
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of "modern" children is presented by Lewis in the relation of
Doremus «^essup and his daughter* (l) It should be added also,
that the author implies no criticism of such a pattern of rela-
I tionships.
Before leaving the concept of sexual equality, the writer
wishes to re-emphasize its importance in terms of the entire
I
structure of American values. It was previously stated that
this was perhaps the inost "distinctive feature" of social demo-
cracy in America. That can be misleading in its implications
;
of making it just a characteristic; it is more than that, how-
ever; it is a positive force toward a fuller realization of
I all the American values. And it is probatly a more significant
I
force, in the manner in which it affects the structure of the
family, early individuation in the child, etc., than almost any
other single factor. Thorstein Veblen was sensitive to this
aspect of it fifty years ago, when he wrote that
The kindergarten, and whatever the kindergarten
spirit counts for in modern education. • .is to be
set down, along with the "new-woman movement", to
the account of that revulsion against futility and
invidious com.parison which the leisure-class life
under modern circumstances includes. in. the women
most immediately exposed to its discipline. In
this way it appears that, by indirection, the insti-
tution of a leisure class here again favours the
growth of a non- invidious attitude, which may, in
the long run prove a menace to the stability of the
institution itself, and even to the institution of
individual ownership on which it rests. (2)
! 1. Lewis, Sinclair, tt Can 't Happen Here , Garden City, ^ew ^ork:
Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1935, p. 151-154.
2. Veblen, Thorstein, The Theory of the Leisure Clasps, New




When one translates this passage from terms of Veblen's
frame of reference to those used in this paper, it will be seen
that there is a high degree of congruence between the two per-
spectives set forth. It is also apparent, with the possible
exception of his reference to Individual ownership, that





The previous discussion of social democracy, especially as
manifested in social responsibility and sexual equality, would
indicate another major area of democratic values-— an area
largely concerned with the values related to the activity of
work. That area will, henceforth, be designated as vocational
democracy. It should be mentioned at the outset that this dis-
cussion is not going to involve any direct consideration of the
economic system. For, in the context already set forth, the
economic system, whether systematic or otherwise, is in large
an instriimentality for the purpose of realizing cultural values-
This, it seems to me, has been especially true in recent years
in American culture as distinguished from European culture.
While there is reason for debate on this, it would appear that
the general tendency toward governmental regulations of economic
enterprise, as manifested in the administrations of Theodore
Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and the New Deal, had been larp:ely
the result of a pragmatic philosophy of economic expediency
adjusting itself toward a fuller realization of the basic
American values. And as the problems have become more complex,
so have the solutions been of an increasing ps^tch-work nature.
This, it seems to me, is a reverse of the European movement
which is guided largely by the effort to apply preconceived
economic doctrines to specific situations. 'I'his is even true
to a limited extent of the Labor government of Britain, one of
c
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the central controversies at present being concerned with how
I
far they should extend the application of the I^abor doctrine
in the face of seemingly opposing economic realities. It is,
in short, a conflict between pragmatists and doctrinarians. In
this sense the New Deal and the platform of the Fair Deal are
;
typical manifestations of the American democratic philosophy,
1
not only in the symbolism of their titles, but also in the
patch-work economic thinking which has guided their development.
I'he origin of vocational democracy, like those of intel-
lectual and social democracy, is deeply imbedded in the American
past and in the manner in which America developed. It is also,
j
as an acculturat ive force, inextricably interrelated with the
other areas of value, and like them, emerges from the previously
j
discussed conception of individuat ive experience. Further, it
jj
! is the least realized of any of the democratic values. In order
,
to orient the reader at the outset, it would be well to set forth
l'
the writer's conception of what he believes to be the modern
j
expression of vocational democracy. In this sense, to achieve
a vocational democracy is to achieve a social and economic
organization in which each individual does the work best suited
' his natural and developed aptitudes, and which is best
suited to the individual need of self-expression and the crea-
tive and esthetic impulsions.
The origin of vocational democracy is seen in the early
agrarian civilization of America in which the majority of the
i
individuals owned and cultivated their own land. Crevecouer
rc
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' recognized the significance of this fact to a democratic cul-
ture when he wrote
s
Some few towns excepted, we are all tillers of the
earth, from Nova Scotia to 7<est Florida. We are a
people of cultivators ,.. .all respecting the laws,
without dreading their power, because they are
equitable. We are all animated with the spirit of
industry, which is unfettered, and unrestrained, be-
cause each person works for himself. (l)
It will be recalled that Jefferson also recognized the im-
portance of this aspect of our civilization, and made it the
basis of all democracy, going so far as to declare democracy
! and urbanlsm incompatible.
With America expanding along the frontier the concept of
vocational democracy, and what one might refer to as the "moral-
ity of 7;ork", received further extension, ^or, until the dev-
I
elopment of the cattle and mining frontiers, it was not a life
amenable to loafers and social parasites. Despite the rudeness
of the life, and the occasional examples of personal demorali-
zation which so offended some eastern observers, it was largely
a life of purpose and industry—-graphically Illustrated by
the rural phrase of "root, hog, or die". With the development
1!
I Of certain organized frontier settlements, such as the Ohio
I
Company's settlement at Marietta, each individual had a job
best suited to his own capabilities and performed a definite




1. Gommager, Henry Steele, Op.Clt
.
. p. 20
2. Hulbert, Archer Butler, Ed. '^he Records of the Original
Proceedings of the Ohio Company." itlarietta Collep;e H^
s
torical Collections. I (1917), pp. 75-78.
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As well as each person usually having his own garden plot,
I individuals were designated to serve in capacities which contri-
buted to the life of the group as a whole---as hunters, surveyors,
carpenters, Indian fighters, etc.(l)
Out of these conditions of early American life, one can
discern the development of certain ideas and concepts of vary-
ing degrees of def initiveness . ^'he first, in point of time, and
in its influence upon American culture, is the concept previously
i referred to as the "morality of work", ..This concept, in inter-
!
action with the traditional respect for the individual and
social equality, forms the basis for vocational democracy; that
lis, the conception of work as a factor of moral discipline and
a necessity to the balanced development of the individual. This
is referred to by Merle Curti when he writes that
The most significant idea that both ordinary country
people and frontiersmen possessed was that of the
value and dignity of their v^ay of life •(2)
Nor was the basis for this lost as America partially emer-
ged from the agrarian and frontier stage. For Edward Dicey
remarked after his visit to America in 1863J
The very circumstances that render the United States
unattractive as a residence for the man of wealth and
refinement are a positive boon to those who possess
neither of these attributes; and I am afraid that in
this world the latter class is larger and more important
than the former •( 5)
1. Ibid , p. 24-27.
B. Curti, Merle, Opw Cit .. p. 38.
3. -Gommager, iienry Steele, Op. Git., p. 130,
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The moral aspect of work is referred to by Hugo iilunster-
berg when he writes?
The profession of living from the income of invest-
ments is virtually unknown among men, and the young
men who take up no money-making profession because
they "don't need to", are able to retain the social
respect of their fellows only by undertaking some
sort of work for the commonwealth* A man who does
not work at anything, no matter hov; rich he is,
can neither get nor keep 9. social status. (l)
One might feel that Munsterberg takes a view not entirely
in conformity with actuality, but it must be remembered that
his basis is what the "best of Americans" believe. It is ap-
parent that this is in conflict with Veblen's theory of emu-
lation of the leisure class, which maintains that the longer
wealth is held the more prestige value it has. Hence, inherited
wealth has more prestige value than the first-generation opulence.
That may be so when taken within the context of emulation and
not social value theory; but even so, it would seem to contra-
dict Veblen's theory on his own grounds when one considers that
Carnegie, Henry Ford, and John D. Rockerfeller are the national
heroes, not their descendants or Tommy Manville.
Herrick expresses the moral value of work and the dignity
of honest enterprise in his reference to Isabelle Lane's father,
who went to the mid-west when it was young and grew with the
community he served:
Altbjough latterly his investments had carried him
into real estate, railroads, and banks, nevertheless
it was as a seller of hardware that he wished to be






known. He was prouder of the Lion brand of tools than
of all his stock holdings .he was an American merchant
and preferred to remain such all his life rather than
add a number of millions to his estate "by playing
faro in Wall Street ".(l)
There is little evidence that Lewis has given any serious
consideration to the value of work, as such, regardless of the
area of activity. With a single exception, the sole motivation
•
:of his characters in the area of vocational behavior is a fina-
ncial one; the exception is his extravagantly romanticized
portrayal of the scientist, whose creed is expressed by Dr.
Gottlieb'.
He wants that everything should be subject to inexorable
laws. (Pre-Sinst ein " science" )•. .he takes both the
American booster and the European aristocrat, and he
ignores all their blither ing. . .He hates zhe preachers
who talk their fables, but he is not too kindly to the
anthropologists and historians who can only make guesses,
yet they have the nerve to call themselves scientists I
Oh, yes, he is a man that all nice good-natured people
should naturally hat el (2)
The concept of work as an integral part of life, as an
element in growth, or as moral discipline of the individual
hVi7»mi£T^ £) cit; "pn ccrl ft f*nT* qpItI AVPrriATTh— nnn a (*»f h'nft^fi ficiDftP're! ar>A
considered in any of Lewis's works, either implicitly or ex-
plicity
.
Also from the rural and frontier culture emerges another
concept related to the value of work. The rural and frontier
aspect is stressed here, because with the exception of craft
1. Herrick, ^obert. Together, New York: The x^acMillan Go^,
1908, p. 111.




and handiwork, an urban and industrial mod© of living has opera4
ted to destroy the realization of this particular value of work,
Reference is here made to the organic interrelationship which
should exist "between the energies devoted to work and other
activities of life, '-i^'his means nothing more than the mainte-
nance of the integrity of the self, there being in the literal
sense an organic int;erpenetrat ion between the self and the
external environment utilized in its work, V/ork is thus part
of the educative process and is a necessity of individual growtb.
Few people have expressed the significance of this area of life
better than Emerson, when he vi/rote that
•••a man coins himself into his labor; turns his day,
his strength, his thought, his affection into some
product which remains as the visible sign of his power;
and to protect that, to secure that to him, to secure
his past self to his future self , is the ob.iect of all
p:overnment . (l)Tlt alios mine)
Herrick expresses the significance of the process involved
in referring to Redfield's reconversion of an old schooner for
a trip to the Caribbean with Serena Masseyi
•••his own ideas of appointments for this floating home
were constantly changing, growing, and he wished to see
the transformation in process*.. It v;as the kind of crea-
tive adjustment to one's environment which appealed to
him most strongly ••• (2
)
Because Redfield was not being payed for his activity does not
mean that it was not v/ork. For work is nothing less than a
1. Lindeman, E.G., Emerson , The Basic V^ritings of America'
s
Sage , New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 1935, p. 1.
2. Herrick, Robert, The .and of De s ir
e
a New York: Farrar &
Rinehart, Inc., 1932, p. 149.
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"creative adjustment to one's environment" through the use of i
intermediate means to achieve a definite and consciously for-
mulated end. Because one ex-presses part of the self in all
creative use of otjective materials, modifying the expression,
and thus the self, in order to control and utilize the mater-
ials at hand, there is interpenetrat ion between self and environ-
ment. The realized understanding of the relationships of this
process of doing and undergoing constitute the meanings and values
of the process of work. It is this which is referred to as the
moral discipline of work, making a richer and more meaningful
self. Less than this is drudgery or automatism, but not work.
The urban- industrial mode of existence has largely shatter-^
ed this as a reality, not only through making the laborer's
activity automatic, mechanical, and piece-meal in many instances,
but also through depriving him of any concern for the distri-
bution and consumption of the product of his labor. The present
writer is not one who searches for a single-cause explanation
for cultural manifestations, but it well worth considering the
effect that results from depriving an individual of his feeling
of personal significance and individuality for half his waking
hours. It is perhaps not too wildly speculative to consider
this as a large source of the anxiety, personal insecurity, and
feelings of insignificance, which are frequently discharged in
fads, race riots, strikes, etc.,-—or any such movement which
gives to the individual in group participation a sense of se-
curity and significance. Because this conception of work is
c
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of such importance in Herrick*s whole perspective, to the per-
spective of this paper, to individualism in a corporate society^
and to the previous definition of "radical" and "liberal", it
is worthwhile to quote John Dewey's consideration of the pro-
blem:
August e Comte said that the great problem of our time is
the organization of the proletariat into the social system ^
The remark is even truer now than when it was made. The
task is impossible of achievement by any revolution that
stops short of affectinp; the imagination and emotions
of man . The values that lead to production and intelli-
gent enjoyment of art have to be incorporated into the
system of social relat ionships « It seems to me that much
of the discussion of proletarian art is aside from the
point because it confuses the personal and deliberate
intent of an artist with the place and operation of
art in society. What is true is that art itself is not
secure under modern conditions until the mass of men
and women who do the useful work of the world have the
opportunity to be free in conducting the processes of
production and are richly endowed in capacity for en-
joying the fruits of collective work. That the material
for art should be drawn from all sources whatever and
that the products of art should be accessible to all
is a demand by the side of which the personal political
intent of the artist is insignificant . (l) (Italics mine)
The above passage is at the core of everything the present
writer has tried to convey---Dewey 's concept of revolution being
that of a radical reorientation of the social system, the rela-
tionship of work to the totality of an individual life, the
difference between the "social" and "sociological" in art, the
necessity for reasserting the organic integrity of art, work,
and life as one complete state of being, and finally, the moral
and humanistic function of art in a cultural context, the view
1. Dewey, John, Art as Experience , New York; Mint on Balch &





with which this paper started all of these things are either
implicit or stated directly.
The segregation of work from the rest of life does not
only apply to the work of the laborer, however, as may have
been inferred from previous passages, 'i'he exclusive focus of
the profit motive as it is so frequently and generally mani-
fested, the general mechanization of life, etc., have all
played a part in bringing this about for many professional and
business men also. A clarification of this aspect comprised a
large part of i^errick's work, and especially as it effected a
cooperative marriage. The pattern of the "husband returning
from the office" which is so v;ide3pread in our civilization, is
quite adequately presented in the case of the Lanes J
Busy day?
They're all busy daysl
Tell me what you did.
Oh,. ..just saw people and dictated letters and telegrams,—
yes, it was a busy day.
And he left her to dress for dinner. (1'
This aspect of what might be called a "philosophy of work",
if that does not seem too elevated, has not occurred to Lewis
to any greater degree than other values of work; consequently,
there is little profit in offering illustration of how it
hasn 't
•
There is a final area of vocational democracy, which is
msinifested in relation to certain aspects that have been oon"
1» Herrick, ^k)bert. Op, Cit., d« 48.
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sidered previously under social and intellectual democracy* In
conjunction with the sense of social responsibility demanded
of everyone in a social democracy, and the achieved excellence
opened to all by intellectual democracy, this phase of vocational
democracy manifests itself as professional integrity, ^t is
|j
recognized that this is not an exclusively American value, but
j
the significance of it in American culture distinguishes it
from the same concept in other cultures, ^or as Crevecouer
said, "Lawyer or merchant are the fairest titles our town
afford". This is simply a recognition of the preeminent place
the professions have held in American life. However, the rise
of modern advertising and marketing techniques have excluded
the merchant from this category as a rule, and the focus will
henceforth be upon the so-called recognized professions.
The basis for the pre-eminent position of, and the respect
accorded to the professions is not alone due to their general
superiority of education and supposedly more "cultivated" and
broadened outlook. Indeed, in terms of social value this has
little significance. And in any culture with an aristocrat ic
tradition it is of even less importance. As in England, the
Navy, the Church, the Army, and the Civil Service, have tradi-
tionally been held above the professions of law and medicine,
and of coiirse, the modern professions of education, architecture,
engineering, etc. In a democracy, however, there is more
validity in the claim of the professions on the basis of achiev-r
ed discipline and excellence in a given field. But even in a
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democracy this is a minor part of the basis for such a claim.
||
The basis of this claim is derived from the literal meaning
of the word "profess", and is symbolized hv the affirmation or
oath which is required of the three traditional professions.
This in turn symbolizes that the abilities and the power of the
professional man are held in trust; and because the abilities
and powers of the minister, lawyer, and doctor are of such im-
portance to the individual and to society, the obligations and
responsibilities of these men are greater than those of any
other "job". In modern life this has, of course, extended in
greater or less degree to architects, scientists, educators,
engineers, and the battle line is now drawn for the artist and
critic. However, there is no need to catalogue the areas where
more than the average amount of social responsibility is de-
manded. It is sufficient to state that in a democracy the pro-
fessions are the highest product of the culture from the point
of achieved excellence in mental, moral, and (for some) manual
discipline, and from the point of the claims put upon their
personal and professional integrity by society. I'herefore,
the quality of professional integrity existing in a culture
is one of the best indices to the realized moral standards of
the culture as a whole. V/here hypocrisy, cant, and bare-faced
shysterism run rampant through the professions there one can
expect to find the sapping of the moral vitality of the entire
culture. It is for this reason that virtually every one of
Herrick's books has a professional man as the protagonist, -^nd
rr
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this is far different from the peevish motive which prompted
Lewis to write such things as Elmer G-antry and Arrowsmlth ,
that is, to "expose" a certain profession. For ^rrick^s pur-
pose as well as the result, in such a focus, was to formulate
a valid index to the limitations of and the depth and integrity
of the cultural pattern.
It was for this reason he feared the increasing speciali-
zation in education and the academic world, which made "know-
ledge*.. an archipelago of small islands instead of a single
continent (l) It was for this reason that he feared the int-
ense focus upon "scholarship" which killed creative thought, anc,
"the root of the matter it was applied to". (2) And it was as
professional men who held the trust of awakening the minds of
future generations that he indicted college presidents and pro-
fessors who capitulated to the demands ana methods of Business-
minded trustees.
Once again an aspect of life which cannot "be photographed
eludes Lewis. Supposedly he "exposes" the medical profession
in all its aspects, following Arrowsmith through school, interH«J
ship, private country practice, public health service, as path-
ologist at an expensive clinic, and finally into the templed
halls of the science behind medicine, in each area he uses
his characteristic method of burlesque, and at not time is ther^
1. Kerrick, ^^obert. Chimes , New York: I'he MacMillan Co.,
1926, p. 72.
2. Ibid, p. 66.
rf
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established any fundamental relation between the rotteness of
the profession and the culture as a v;hole. By that it is meant
that commercialism is not dramatically portrayed as eating into
the integrity of the profession and of the individual, as is
done in the cumulative retrogression of Hart and Lane in The
Common Lot and Together . Lewis's world is rotten to begin with,
and it is the honest and sincere people, like Gottlieb and
Arrowsmith, who are inevitably beaten by it—-and even then,
the defeat which is incurred is the result of a fatalistic
overwhelming of events, rather than the outcome of the lack of
integrity of their professional colleagues. The implied criti-
cism here is that though Lewis paints a black picture it is not
!
symptomatic of American culture, and it has no meaning because




PRACTICAL IDEALISM AND REALIZED CORPORATENESS
The final area of democratic values is that which emerges
from American practical idealism—-the mind-temper which is the
foundation for the achieved realization of our entire structure
of values. Not only does it, as an acculturati ve force, bind
the structure together; hut if fully realized by the individual^
practical idealism also reconciles and makes complementary the
two apparent opposites, individualism and corporateness « As an
element in the American quality of experience, it is as old as
anything which can be properly called "American", having emerged
at a time when our culture could ill afford the luxury of ab-
stract theorizing. It is the source and substance of our though
and in some aspect or other, has been part of the perspective
of virtually every great American thinker from Jonathan Edwards
to the present day.
The distinctive featin'e of practical idealism is its focus
upon the psychological realities of human experience, rather
than metaphysical abstractions about experience. Jonathan
Edwards made this distinction in his discussion of "A Divine
and Supernatural Light";
Thus there is a Difference between having an Opinion
that God is holy and gracious, and having a sense of
the Loveliness and Beauty of that Holiness and Grace.
There is a Difference between having. ^ rational Judg-
ment that Honey is sweet, and hav ing a sense of its
sweetness .( l) (Italics mine)
1. Blair, Hornberger, and Stewart, The Literature of the United
States , New York: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1946, p.l76#
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Before developing a complete formulation of practical idealism
in its modern context it would be well to mention two of its
I
more significant mutations, which have previously been touched
I
upon in relation to several other areas of value. These are,
the traditional American attitude of ant i-intellectualism and
I
the fear of abstractions, '•''he former has been considered in
relation to -Lewis's burlesque of it, (cf.pp. 12-15,30,36-37,
|
55-57) and the latter T/ith reference to derrick's philosophy
j of education. (cf.pp. 30-31,49-51) Hence, there is no further
need to discuss them in relation to the critical function of
this paper. However, it is this writeri's opinion that these
features are among the healthiest aspects of our cultural pat-
tern, and as such, deserve a more detailed discussion. The
historical process in which these attitudes developed has also
I been considered, (cf.pp. 38.) the only purpose of the present
discussion being to inquire into their significance in terms
{
of modem life. The two aspects will ce discussed together,
'for in reality they are but related phases of the same thing,
ant i-intellectualism being a sort of garden variety of the disc-
riminating dislike of abstract ions .( 1
)
To t To those who would like to see an organized intelligance
applied to social, economic, and political problems, the atti-
1. It should be mentioned that there is no inconsistency in the
writer's belief in an affirmative value in a cultural atti-
tude of anti-intellectualism and his censure of Lewis for
a personal anti-intellectualism. i'or as a mode of public
behavior it can have certain positive features; but as part
of the perspective of one who should interpret and clarify
the meaning of our culture, it has no justification.
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tude of anti-intellectualism is frequently seen as an unmltl-
^ gated evil. Such manifestations as the popular stereotype of
the mythical "college professor", the frequent contempt for any-j
one who presents a new idea, and the sneering remarks at "brain
|
' trusts" when specialists are given positions of public responsi-i
;
bility such manifestations as these are frequently dishearten-!
ing to those who wish to see society organized on a more firm
basis than the operations of caprice and chance. At such times
i'
one is inclined to share the rather peevish mood of Emerson
when he wrote, that "The so-called 'practical men' sneer at
speculative men, as if, because they speculate or see, they
could do nothing" .(l) And yet, the coin has another side also,
I which in all likelihood, has a most beneficial effect in Ameri-
' can life.
In a previously mentioned article by Russell Lynes, the
author states:
j
In many European societies to which the American
intellectual looks for historic comfort, the intel-
lectuals have long been recognized, • .as a distinct
class...But Americans, it seems, expect every man
to take an active part and rather resent a group
that sits by and criticizes(2)
'"'he above is not incompatible with Emerson's remark, for
Lynes is concerned here with the self-styled intellectual who
has no function in society. It Is significant that the only
1. Carpenter, Frederic I. Emerson, New York: American Book Col,
1934, p. 58.
I
s. Lynes, Russell," Intellectuals vs. Philistines", I'he New Times
Book Review , July 10, 1949, p. 1.
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real haven this type has found is in i^ew York, a factor which
Lynes points out. -^or it is only there that the intellectual is^
able to maintain the fiction of the self-styled elite segregated
from the great majority of his fellow men. Elsewhere in the
country, the force of anti-int ellectualism brings the intellec-
tual closer to reality and narrows the gulf between him and the '
rest of society. (l) •'^or this reason he must become an integra-
j
ted element of the social si?ructure in order to realize his aims'*
At the same time this tends to integrate his intellectual, life
with his efforts to attain a livelihood. Thus, the American
editor or critic or educator must "intellectualize" within
the office of his vocation. This not only operates to make
him eschew abstract and overly esoteric theorizing, but it
also impels him to assume the responsibility for his statements.
It is this which is held to be the major positive feature of
anti-intellectualism, its beneficial effects being apparent
[
when one compares the present American intellectual of the non-
elite, with his European counterpart in countries where the
intellectual elite is an established class.
In a recent article analysing the chaos among the present-
day French intellectuals. Sherry Mangan finds much of it due
to the fact that "the typical French intellectual has for four
centuries been the individualist". (2) This has precluded the
1. Curti, Merle, Op. Cit
.
, p. 710.
2. Mangan, Sherry, "The French Intellectual -»ierry-ao-Round"
,
Commentary , Vll (June, 1949), p, 559.
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social integration of the French intellectual, as well as any
integration between his economic life and his intellectual life.
Mr. Mangan refers to this latter aspect in stating that:
Naturally, French intellectuals cannot all decide
their positions on purely abstract grounds, since
they do not live in an economic vacuum. Yet because
there is in general a greater separation or insula-
tion between their breadwinning occupations and their
political sympathies and writings than in the United
States, Britain, or Weiraar Germany, they believe they
can be more independent . (l)
The result is that one finds such intellectuals as the
Joliot-Curies moving from a position of Ant i- St alinism in 1939
I
to Communist and sympathizer during the war, with Andre Malraux
|reversing the process, from Communist sympathizer to staunch
De Gaullism during the same period. (2)
I
Though not experiencing quite the same confusion as in
France, the intellectual elite of Italy is in an equally un-
healthy position, and for much the same reason; that is, its
lack of social integration. In the present context, in which
the concern is for political activity only, the Socialists
(the Saragat group and similar parties) are the only ones who
can properly claim to base their progreun on intelligent dis-
crimination of values. The other parties. Catholics, Fascists,
I
Monarchists, and Communists are carried along on the sheer
force of fanaticism. With regard to the effectiveness of the
Socialists, the Manchester Guardian recently reported that
1. Loc . cit
.
2. Ibid, p. 554.
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During the Fascist period they lost to the Communists
the greater part of their working-class support, and
tend to remain an elite of more or less ambitious in-
tellectuals without a proletarian background or roots
embedded in the trade unions. (1)
This should be sufficient to illustrate the writer's con-
tention that, exasperating though it may he at times, the
American attitude of anti-int ellectualism is probably in the
Mng run a healthy and stabilizing factor in our culture. We
can now turn to the more positive features of practical ideal-
ism*
To find an adequate formulation of practical idealism as a
theory of social value, we cannot de better than to refer once
more to John Dewey, who has done more perhaps than any other
person to clarify it in all its implications!
A genuine idealism and one compatible with science will
emerge as soon as philosophy accepts the teaching of
science that ideas are statements not of what is or has
been but of acts to be performed. . .ideas are worthless
except as they pas? into actions which rearrange and re-
construct in some way, be it little or large, the world
in which we live.
To seek after ideas and to cling to them as means of con-
ducting operations, as factors in practical arts, is to
participate in creating a world in which the springs of
thinking will be clear and ever-flowing. (2)
Whether one calls this pragmatism, instrument alism, Emerson
isnism, or practical idealism, it is an expression of the Ameri-
can quality of experience, and is at the center of the main
current of American thought. In the philosophy of William
1. Jucker, Ninetta S., "Italy Faces West". The Manchester Guar-
dian Weekly , LX (June 30, 1949), p. 6.
2, Dewey, John, Intelligence in the Modern World, New York:
Random House, Inc., 1939, p. 342,
•
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James it provides the basis for a moral philosophy which is es*-
sentially the formulation of a cumulatively expanding ethical
democracy!
Since victory and defeat there must he, the victory
to be philosophically prayed for is that of the more
Inclusive aide,-—of the side which even in the hour
of triumph will to some degree do justice to the ideals
in which the vanquished party's interests lay. The
course of history is nothing but the story of men's
struggles from generation to generation to find the
more and more inclusive order. Invent some manner
of realizing your own ideals which will also satisfy
the alien demands. (l)
This conception of practical idealism formed the context
within which Herrick affirmed his faith in functional education,
an educative process which would enable the individual "to par-
ticipate in creating a world in which the springs of thinking
will be clear and ever-flowing". This is the essence of the
American belief in the practicality of education, and it is,
in the final analysis, the only kind of education which is
ever really practical. The reader need only refer to the pre-
vious quotations from Herrick 's works, in reference to scholar-
j
ship, academic specialization, the value of work, etc., in orderj
to verify the importance of this conception of value in relatioi^
to Herrick's general perspective. (cf
.pp. 30-31,49-51,89-90,109) t
From the reservoir of practical idealism interacting with
an ever-expanding intellectual, cultural, and material wealth,
has emerged the American Idea of Progress---the American Dream.
1. James, William, Essays on Faith and Morals , New York;
Longmans, Green & Co., 1947, p. 205.
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This has been frequently referred to as a heritage from the Age
of Enllghtment and its concept of the "perfectibility of man".
Such a view(cf .pp. 19-20) is advanced by writers who, in some
manner, conceive of "ideas" as composed of an immutable sub-
stance, and which are transferred unaltered through space and
time. Such a view is, of course, an implicit rejection of
practical idealism, in that it conceives of "ideas" as abstract-
ions separable from a context of relationships, and divorced
from any meaning attained in their experienced realization. It
is an absurd view, and runs counter, not only to all traditional
American thought, but also, to the best in modern science and
philosophy
.
The American has believed in the idea of progress, not be-
cause it was advanced by the Age of Enlightment ^although that
was perhaps not without its effect), but primarily because he
has experienced progress. Every generation has witnessed con-
stantly expanding horizons in every area, a fuller realization
of ideals, and betterment of the conditions of living. This
faith is true of society as well as the individual; the story
of "rag-to-riches", the ^oratio Alger story, has become a cul-
tural legend-—or myth. It should not be inferred that the
writer is here asserting a Rotarian's faith in progress, nor
the Panglossi^ faith that this is "the best of all possible
worlds". This is merely an attempt to clarify the basis for
the American faith in progress; and perhaps it is one of the
saving features of a democratic culture that people expressing
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such widely differing standards of value as, for example, John
'Dewey and Eric Johnston, can at the same time justify this
faith. Jefferson expressed this faith as well as the basis for
it, when he wrote near the end of his life J
I am eighty-one years of age, born where I now live,
in the first range of mountains in the interior of
ovac country. And I have observed this march of civili-
zation advancing from the sea-coast, passing over us
like a cloud of light, increasing our knowledge and
improving our conditions, insomuch as that we are at
this time more advanced in civilization here than the
seaports were when i was a boy. And where this pro-
gress will stop no one can say«(l)
However, the belief in progress is of no importance except
insofar as it develops a temper of mind conducive to growth. It
is the values which emerge from this quality of mind that are
to be explored in the following discussion—-one of the most
significant of which is the traditional American ideal to break
with the deference to past generations, tradition, etc. ''he
interrelationship is apparent when one refers to the above quo-
•
tation in conjunction with a statement of Jefferson's written
about ten years earlier:
The earth belongs to the living, not to the dead.
The will and power of man expire with his life, by
nature's law...Each generation has the usufruct of
the earth during the period of its continuance.
When it ceases to exist, the usufruct passes on to
the succeeding generation, free and unencumbered, and
so on, successively, from one generation to another
forever .(2)
|1. Jefferson, Thomas, Jefferson's Letters, fiau Clair. Wisconsin:
E.M. Hale & Co. (arranged by »villson Vifhitman)p. 371.
2. Jefferson, Thomas, Thomas Jefferson on Democracy, i^'ew York:
Penguin Books, Inc., 1939, p. 15.
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And Emerson, who arraigned the "literal, slavish following
of precedents, as by a justice of the peace", (l) wrote in his
Journal J "The dead sleep in their moonless night; my busi-
ness is with the living". (2)
This ideal is symbolized by Herrick in the entire substance
of Chimes, in presenting the effete and tradition-conscious
graduate of Harvard in conflict with the raw spirit of groping
democratic functionalism at Eureka University-—the very name
of the university itself being a symbol of discovery and the
future. The ideal is realized in Glavercin's awakening aware-
ness of the validity of the new approach, the portrayal of which
was in many respects a duplication of Herrick's own achieved
realization.
Again, in Together, when young Vickers Price comes into
conflict with his father over his future destiny, it is a con-
flict between the realized values of a new generation and the
accepted mores of the old:
The young man tried to find words which would fully
express his feeling. He had come a long way these
last hours in his ideas of life; he saw things naked
and clear cut, without dubious shades. But he had to
realize how that what his soul accepted as incontrover-
tible logic was meaningless to others. (3)
Not only must one break with deference to the past, and
abandon fixed ideas in order to achieve growth and maintain
1. Lindeman, Eduard C, Qp« Git. , p. 2.
2. Carpenter, Frederic I. Op. Git
.
, p. xiv.
3. Herrick, Robert, Op. Cit p. 150.
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equilibrium with a process reality; but there is another impor-
tant value concept which emerges from practical idealism, the
realization of which is also a factor in growth, '-^-'his, the
realization of which is as essential to the development of
cultin'e and civilization as it is to the individual, is the
value of non-conformity.
Individuality begins when the mind first comes into con-
flict with established ideas and customs; and if, in maintain-
ing the integrity of the self, the mind utilizes the opposing
force without conforming to it, then there is growth. It is
obvious that this does not refer to specious non-conformity, the
carefully-conscious Eohemianism of pseudo-artists and pseudo-
intellectuals. Valid non- conformity, the product of a creative
mind and individual integrity, does not need such overt mani-
festations in order to maintain its individuality.
As mentioned above, the civilization as well as the indi-
vidual, shares in the value of non-conformity. It is not ne-
cessarily an expression of the "great man" theory of history
when one states that "an institution is the lengthened shadow
of one man". Rather, it is merely a recognition of the emer-
gence of a great mind as an important cultural force. J.W.N.
Sullivan, in The Limitations of Science , refers to the fact
that Einstein onee said of some of the work of Karl Friederich
Gauss, that "if its author had not thought of it, there is no
reason to suppose that it would have ever been thought of."(l)
1. Sullivan, J.W.N. , The Limitations of Science . New York:
The New American Library, 1933, p. 168.
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Sullivan goes on to state that this could be applied with equal
if not more validity to Einstein *s own theory, which
•••is so original that it is very difficult, even
after the event, to provide it with an ancestry.
It was not in the least a natural culmination of
the ideas that preceded it. It was a bolt from the
blue.(l)
Such non-conformity is no less important in its smaller
manifestations than in the larger ones, ^^or whether civiliza-
tion grows, as it sometimes does in science, through the shock
of a revolutionary idea, or as is usual in its social and intel-
lectual life, through the gradual accretion of the new and ero-
sion of the old, brought about by honest minds expressing
individual differences, it grows only through the actions of
individuals. "Aims, ideals, do not exist simply in 'mind';
they exist in character, in personality and action." (2)
Non-conformity in action, as in thought, is essentially a
recognition of the potentialities which are precluded by es-
tablished custom, in action taking the form of experimental
morality. As James said, we must " invent new means" to realize
o\xp ideals. The necessity for this is barely sensed by Eliza-
beth J^ane in bidding goodbye to her brother, Vickers, al-
most glad that he was strong enough to take his fate in his
hands, to test life, to break the rules... "(3)
1. loc .cit
.
2. Dewey, oohn. Intelligence in the ^iodern World, New York:
Random House, Inc., 1930, p, 1023.




It is by the same sort of experimental morality and honest
non-conformity that Margaret Pole and Rob Falkner finally rea-
lize the mutual values of their love; for
It takes time to know this babbling life» to know
what is real and what is counterfeit. Before or
after, who knows how it might have been?...
So it was true. By what they had suffered, apart,
by what they had tested and rejected, they had
fitted themselves to come together, for this point
of time..«^l)
It was implied above that practical idealism is, in a
manner of speaking, the cement of the American structure of
values. This does not negate earlier references to the fact
that these values are by their nature, interactive and inte-
grative; rather, it complements such references. For the value||s
as such are, of course, merely abstractions, ideals to be rea-
lized that they become interactive and integrative. This pro-
cess has, within the context of our culture, or society, been
defined as practical idealism. It will now be set forth within
the context of individualism as the process of individuation ;
that is, the process by which one achieves an integrated co-
herent and continuously growing individuality. In less specif icj
terms it is simply the process of individual development, the
self-creative process of the self.
Tft'ithin the perspective set forth in the Introduction, it
is assumed that this is a natural process. It might be best
to state that such a conception of human experience need not
1. Ibid, p. 334.
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1. Ibid, p. 334.
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to the "civilized man". Such terms are not to "be taken as defi-1
nite stages of development, but rather, as abstractions of ge-
neral areas in the process, -^^inally, though the terms are not
"scientific" in the more limited sense, they are not without
significance in the context of realized values. The view to
be presented is simply a distillation of the expressions of
our most significant modern artists and philosophers. After all
we cannot afford to wait for the sociologist and brass-bar psy-
chologist to discover this; as Frank LLoyd Wright has said,
"The artist's perception science later verif ies (l)
In virtually everything Kerrick wrote, some phase of, if
not the entire individuating process, was clarified; and in
some of his works, as in Together « he uses a representative
sam-pling of characters to clarify various stages of the process.
This is seen to a certain extent in Rob Falkner, the rugged
engineer who is first portrayed as the "natural man". This is
the area of emotional individuation, when the individual realize|^
that the basis of value lies in the expression of one's natural
faculties and drives. In his attempt to persuade i^argaret Pole
to leave her husband as he has left his nagging and neurotic
wife, Rob states:
I hate to be limited by the opinions, the prejudices
of other people, of any one, ... .There seems a cowardice
in silently acquiescing in social laws that I don't
respect, because the majority so wills it. (2)
1* Wright, Frank LLoyd, Genius and the i.4obocracy » New York:
E>uell, Sloan & Pearce, 1949, p. 22.






However, Mfirgaret is aware of the need for social responsi-
bility, a responsibility to themselves; to their respective
mates, and to society at large; and it is not until Rob also
arrives at this understanding that they are enabled to rejoin
one another. In this they achieve the same state of awareness
and understanding as the Harts in The Common Lot, that is. the
responsibility of the "common man" toward participating in the
formation of social values. In terms of the individuat ive pro-
cess, this could be called the phase of intellectual individua-
tion, the period when one arrives at an intellectual Justifica-
tion of himself and his role in life,-—when intelligence be-
comes the clarifier and arbiter of emotions and impulse.
The final justification of the individuat ive process is in
the emjergence of the "civilized man", the person for whom the
world has expanded from the corporate society of the "common
man" to a corporate humanity, •'•he civilized man is one who has
achieved an integrated individuation, in which are harmonized
the faculties and drives of the natural man with a realized
understanding of the cultural heritage of a corporate humanity.
"He is the compend of time. ..the correlative of nature". (l)
In part, this consists in extending one's identification to all
Immanity, not bounaed b;/ the accidents of space and time; and
in becoming sensitized to the potentialities of human experience
one thus becomes sensitized to the potentialities of all humani-
1« Emerson, Ralph Waldo, Essays, New ^ork: Literary Classics,





This Is the realization achieved by Beckwith in Chimes »
Redf ield in The End of Desire . and it was toward this that Isa-
belle Lane was striving when she realized that it "was her
country, her people, her civilization that she looked out on."(l)
For it was then that she realized that
Each one of these millions had its own drama, each
to itself, as hers had "been to her, with that tragic
importance of being lived but once from the germ to
the ultimate dust.Ts)
It is this understanding of the civilized man that is im-
plied in Emerson's fable of One Man,
present to all particular men only partially, or
through one faculty; and that you mijst take the whole
society to find the whole man. Man is not a farmer,
or a professor, or an engineer, but he is all. Man
is priest, and scholar, and statesman, and producer,
and soldier •.. .The fable implies that the individual,
to possess himself, must sometimes return from his
won labor to embrace all the other laborers. (3)
This is not mysticism, although such concepts have been
expressed by mystics; nor is it transcendental in that it re-
cognized that the individual's interrelationships with man and
nature extend beyond the present space-time event, -'t is this
sense of interrelationships which Steinbeck presents in what is,
in my opinion, one of the most unpretentious, yet expressive,
passages in our literature. In his "leisurely journal of trave]
and research", he writes of his experience in the Sea of CortezJ
1. Herrick, Robert, O^. Cit
.
, p. 528.
2. Iqc . cit
.





And if we seem a small factor in a huge pattern,
nevertheless it is of relative importance. We
take a tiny colony of soft corals from a rock in
a little water world. And that isn't terribly
important to the tide pool, •t'lfty miles away the
Japanese shrimp hoats are dredging with overlapping
scoops, bringing up tons of shrimps, rapidly
destroying the species so that it may never come
back, and with the species destroying the ecological
balance of the whole region. That isn't very important
in the world. And six thousand miles away the great
bombs are falling on London and the stars are not
moved thereby. None of it is important or all of it is.(l)
In order to illustrate that the conception of a corporate
humanity emerges from the American quality of experience and
structure of values, as such , and is not just a product of my
Own selectivity, 1 would like to draw upon a writer whose philo-
sophic perspective is diametrically opposed to that presented
in this paper. In a rather pretentious and somewhat dogmatic
volume entitled ''^ur Emergent Civilization , Ruth Nanda Anshen,
the editor, crystallized the thought of her colleagues in her
final essay on "The Emergence of the New Ideals". Inasmuch as
Dr. Ashen planned and edited the volume, it is reasonable to
assume that she is qualified to speak for the view presented by
its contributors, who "endeavored, with unity of purpose, to
reveal the fundamental truth in the life of modern man". (2)
One of the so-called "new ideals" Dr. Anshen and her collabora-
tors have formulated is that
...our end is to exchange our own limited manner
of being subjective, isolated, abandoned for the
1. Steinbeck, John & Rlcketts, S.F., Sea of Cortez , New York:
The Viking Press, 1941, p. 4.
2. Anshen, i^uth Nanda, The Jimergence of the New Ideals", Our
Emerp:ent Givilizat ion « New York: Harper & Brothers, Publish-
ers, 1947, p. 297.—=
€
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universal 's unlimited manner of simply being, and
thereby identifying ourselves with humanity. And
this is perhaps the only meaning of immortality.
It exists when we cease to identify our self with
the perishable psychophysical self and when we
recognize ourselves in all mankind. (l)
An indication of Dr. Anshen's metaphysical frame-of-refer-
ence can be gained from her statement concerning the individual
as a personality:
But when considered as a person, metaphysically
bound to his individuality from which in truth
he cannot be separated, then is he led directly
to the absolute » since only in this, his spiritual
homeland , can man experience his full sufficiency
and transcend the existential world, thereby atten-
uating its limitations, cruelty and despair . (2 )( It alios mine)
m
If the present writer may take the liberty of criticizing
his betters, it would appear to him that the quasi-myst icism
of the above paragraph constitutes lust so much intellectual
baggage. It is submitted here that we need not "cease to
identify our self with the perishable physical self." in order
to experience our "full sufficiency." ^ the contrary, it is
precisely in retaining the concept of the psycho-physical self
that we are enabled to identify ourselves with humanity, -^or
it is in the recognition of man as an evolved species in which
each individual, because he shares basically the same relation-
ships among the components of his organic being, also shares
in the potentialities of the developmental process of the race.
It is in this process that one finds the "beginning" and "end"
of the process of realization of the basic American values, for
1. Ibid, p. 300.




The one thing in the world, of value, is the active
soul. This every man is entitled to; this every
man contains v;ithin him, although in almost all men
obstructed said as yet unborn.... In this action it is
genius; not the privilege of here and there a favorite,
but the sound estate of every man. In its essence it
is progressive, (l)
The function of literature, as of all art, is to activate
the "as yet unborn" soul of man. In the American cul-cure, part
of that function is to clarify the democratic values, i.e.,
life-values, and thus facilitate the process of individuation
toward the civilized man, which is the heritage and potentiality
of every man. This is, in the final analysis, the only really
functional approach to literature in a democratic culture, ^or
is this essentially a "modern" or "radical" approach, except
in the sense that all deraocractic values are and very likely
will continue to be modern and radical* But it is an American
approach, and one which has long been recognized by American
artists. This was the core of Emerson's artistic perspective,
and it is illustrated in Whitman's quotation of a question
asked by The Librarian of Congress in 1869 at a convention of
the "social sciences": "The true question to ask respecting a
book, is, has it help'd any human soul ?" (2 )( It alios given)
The writer does not apoligize for what may appear to be a
dogmatic approach to his subject-matter. It is perhaps more
accurately termed an "honest arrogance" emerging from a belief
1* Carpenter, Frederic I., Op. Cit
.
, p. 56.
2. WMtman, Walt, The Complete Prose of Walt Whitman, New York:
Pellegrini & Gudahy, 1948, p. 254.

137
in the importance of the cultural function of literature* It
is expecially important in Amsrican culture, where a superficial
literacy of unparalleled scope offers great potentialities for
a real literacy. There is more to American literature than is
bo he found in the best-seller list of the New York Eerald-
Trihune, and there is more than is to be found in the cultist
activities of the so-called "new critics". It is for this
reason that the writer has referred to other artists than Her-
rick in illustrating his thesis, i'or all serious and authentic
^erican artists share, in greater or less degree, the perspecti\(|0
of Robert Herrick. And when the American reading public is
educated and sensitized to the level of real literacy, that is,
when literature is democratized, it will have achieved its
rightful place in a democracy of "civilized men". At that time
the solution to one of the most important problems in Western
Civilization will be found, the problem which Whitman defined as
•••how to combine one's duty and policy as a member of
associations, societies, brotherhoods, or what not, and
one's obligations to the State and Nation, with essential
freedom as an individual personality, without which free-
dom a man cannot grow or expand, or be full, modern
heroic, democratic, American. (1
J
It was stated in the early part of this paper that the
American tendency toward socialization, i.e., co-operative cor-
orateness, differed essentially from its modern European counter
art, and especially Marxism. That belief is now reiterated.
And it is maintained that American co-operative corporat eness
1. Ibid, ?• 348.
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is to be achieved in the process of realization of the democra-
tic values. Inasmuch as an integral part of these values is
that conception of experience set forth as the process of indlvl
duation, it is held that democratic corporateness can be achie-
ved without loss of freedom of the individual personality.
Indeed, neither full individual freedom, nor its counterpart,
a corporate humanity, can be fully realized except in their
mutual interaction. And though the relationships in experience
are seldom self-evident except in moments of crises, no man
is wholly free unless all men are free. Wherever men are
threatened, wherever men live in fear, to that extent also my
own freedom is threatened, my own security is lessened, for
No man is an Illajnd, intire of it selfe; every man is
a peece of the Cont inent j a part of the maine; if a
Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse,
as well as if a Promontor ie were, as well as if a l-l&n-
nor of thy friends or of thine owne were; any mans
death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind
e
;
And therefore never send to know for v;hom the bell
tolls; It tolls for thee.(l)
In taking this as the theme of his last novel, Hemingway
identified himself with the main current of significant Ameri-
can writers who have interpreted and expressed the basic dema-
cratic values the final extension of which Is in the realm
of spiritual democracy, i.e., a corporate humanity. Herrlck
was, and is, a vital part of this stream; and in his works he
presented a perception of the meaning of America which has been
1, Hemingway, Srnest, For Whom the Bell Tolls, New York:












In order to recapitulate the findings of this inquiry, and
to summarize the function of literature in the acculturat ive and
indlviduative processes, perhaps it will be of assistance to re-
fer to the perspective set forth in the Introduction.
V/ithin this framework it is maintained that what is re-
ferred to as man's "mind" is a function of the entire organi-
sm, fiind is the product of a cumulative developmental evolvement
of the species. This process of evolvement consists of a cumu-
lative interpenetrat ion between man and nature, in which new
and increasingly complex relationships sire instituted among the
various components of the organism. As mentioned before, this
process results in increasing sensitivity and responsiveness
to nature, i.e., all that is "other" that the individual organi^j
sm, and offers more opportunity for inventiveness and novelty
in action, new channels of behavior and new areas of experience]
and offers opportunity for an increasingly discriminating evalu-J
ation of life. The achieved cumulative result of it all is an
increased humanness.
What is true of the race is true of the Individual as welli
But instead of calling the process one of individual evolution,
we have referred to it as the process of individuation. This i^
a cumulative continuous and unique succession of realizations
of value in interpenetrat ion with the environment, the realized
values being Integrated into the self to provide for an ex-
rc
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panded and more significant life. It is also maintained that
this is a natural process, and corresponds to the harmonic
adjustment to the environment which is characteristic of growth
in all organisms. If we are to be consistent in maintaining a
scientific approach to life, it necessarily follows that this
process is the only "end", as such, in human experience, all
else being a function of realized individuation, as is also
the self. Therefore the individuat ive process is the basis
for all value, all else being evaluated in the light of its
contribution to individual growth* In other terms, the indivi-
duative process is a cumulative one of the experienced realiza-
tions of the meanings and values of experience. And because
nature, and therefore experience, is a process of "prehensive
unification" (cf . pp« 16-13) the self must necessarily be a
cumulative process if it is to maintain an inner equilibri\im
and equilibrium with its environment.
Literature, like all other areas of experience, is to be
evaluated on the basis of its contribution to the individuative
process; that is, the test of literature is life, the quality
of value realized in the literary experience and assimilated
into an integrated understanding of the meaning of life. V<ith-
in this frame of reference the function of literature is a dual
one, both aspects interacting and reinforcing one another.
One of these functions is as an acculturative force, i.e.,
the clarification of cultural values. It is on the basis of an
lander standing of this function that the present inquiry has
((
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been in part an attempt to formulate an integrated structure of
democratic values. With this structure as an index, we have
sought to evaluate the respective authors in terms of the vali-
dity and significance of their writings as social criticism.
And in each area of values---individualism, intellectual,
social, and vocational democracy, and practical idealism---
we have seen that Robert Herrick presents an authentic express-
ion and clarification of a democratic culture, ^nd conversely,
we have seen that in each area Sinclair Lewis has failed to
present evidence of an understanding of the underlying quality
of American life. It follows, therefore, that Herrick, in pre-
SBnting the actualities of American life in contrast to the
xmrealized potentialities, meets the test of creative literature
as an acculturat ive force. That is to say, he has presented a
valid indictment of the limitations of our civilization and has
clarified the meaning of our culture .
Conversely, the exclusive concern of Lewis for the super-
ficial facts of existence, the surface aspects of our civili-
zation, the lack of representativeness of those facts> his lack
of understanding of the process of human experience, and his
utter lack of comprehension of the meaning of American values
—have prevented the realization of a valid or significant
literary experience. In short, his work is of no significance
as an accultur ative force or as social criticism.
The second area in which literature functions is in the
individuative process, -^nd because, as we have already seen
c
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the democratic values are oriented toward the cumulative and
integrated development of the individual, any literary exper-
ience which is a significant factor in the acculturative process
is also significant in terms of the process of individuation.
Accordingly, Herrick offers to the sensitized reader a literary
experience informed with social significance and the opportunity
to further the individuat ive process through the achieved reali-
zation of meanings and values in life. In short, he stimulates
the reader to achieve a "higher-powered and more significant"
level of equilibrium and adjustment to life.
The writer is aware the the foregoing treatment is not a
complete presentation of the structure of democratic values;
nor is it an exhaustive utilization of his own critical frame
of reference. To some extent these limitations are imposed by
the merely mechanical aspects of space and time; in part they
are due to the fact that the nature of this frame of reference
is such as to preclude complete definitiveness—-there being no
ultimate completion in reality itself; and finally, it is not
unlikely that certain limitations are imposed by the writer's
ov/n inadequacies. In spite of these factors, it is my opinion
that the general perspective presented in this inquiry is a
necessary conclusion of the entire drift of the modern climate
of opinion, and as such, represents more than Just "another
point of view"
.
There is not the space here to develop the frame of refer-
ence of the modern Zeitgeist ; h07;ever, the greater part of this
i
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frame-work emerges from a single concept concerning the nature
of reality; that is, the conception of reality as process.
And not only does almost the entire modern climate of opinion
emerge from this conception of reality, but so does the present
critical perspective, -^or in a process reality, the meaning,
significance, and value of everjrthing is determined by its
functional interrelationships within the total context of
reality. Nothing is static; and all thinking on the basis of
a static reality is self-delusion, -^ence, it is a patent ab-
surdity to search for immutable values in modern functional lit-
erature. All the verbalist ic jargon concerning intuition of
Beauty, "objective" values of form, self-expression, objectified
pleasure, etc., emerges from a pre-scient if ic manner of thinking,
and all such approaches are totally inapplicable to an authentic
and significant litereTy experience.
It follows, therefore, that the modern novel is to be
evaluated on the basis of its meaning, significance, and value
(i.e., its function) in relation to the interacting processes
of acculturation and individuation. It has been pointed out
that in an authentic democratic culture, a literary work of art
which serves one of these processes also serves the other.
For, in the clarification and expanded realization of cultural
values, the way is opened for the individual to achieve an
expanded range and deepening of meaning of life in the serial
process of value realizations. It is maintained that the gen-
eral perspective presented in the course of this discussion
r
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(with variations in specific applications, of course) is the
only really functional approach to the problem of literature in
a democratic culture. I'hat is, it seeks to further the reali-
zation of the democratic values, and extend these to include
the democratization of art. Such a view emphasizes the neces-
sity for a restoration of literature to its rightful organic
relationship with other areas of human experience. By impli-
cation, this means also releasing the stranglehold attained on
literature "by the academic and "literary " mind, as well as
a total re-orient ation of the social structure of American in
order to realize these authentic democratic values.
Within the process of realization of these values litera-
tiire \7ill become an increasingly authentic expression of the
quality of experience of a deiiocratic way of life, and will
become increasingly more functional in the clarification and
interpretation of the basic values which define that quality
of experience. It is within such a context that the modern
novel will seek to "serve life and not a mode of living"; for
on the basis of a functional approach to the meaning of a demo-
cratic culture the serious novelist will no longer have a
narrow concern for political, economic, or sociological theoriei^
as such. Rather, the focus will become centered upon the
basic values of human experience, i.e., a focus which will
extend the democratization of the idea of culture itself .
And this brings us to a summary of the final area of signi|
ficance of the modern functional novel, which is, the concern
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for value itself. For it is in this area that the modern novel
has its greatest potential significance, in contributing to
the integration of art, science, and philosophy, in a cooperative
approach to the clarification of a functional theory of value.
Only on the "basis of such an integrated cooperative ideational
process can world civilization meet the tests posed by the
problems of inter-cultural understanding; and only on this
"basis can we successfully combat the present creeping paralysis
of thought in America.
However, it is my opinion that snach a future is within
the reach of hiiman realization; and during the course of this
inquiry my faith in the contribution of America and American
literature has increased* For we have seen, as Emerson did,
what "cubic values America has, and in these a better certifi-
cate of civilization than great cities or enormous wealth." (l)
And in the growing concern of American novelists for these
values lie the potentialities for the realization of an authen-
tic democratic culture. In a like manner, the novelist is capa-
ble of furthering the achievement by the mass of individuals of
a more meaningful, significant, and valuable role in the life-
process of the Race of Man. Finally, through an extended appli-
cation of the democratic values in interaction with the integra-
ted individuat ive process, we can see indications of a higher
phase of existence for the Race of ivlan. This phase if achieved,
.Carpenter, Frederic I. Emerson ^ l>iew York: American Book Com-
pany, 1934, p. 362,
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will see a greater respect for the place of the individual in
the destiny of Man, with an attendant realization of a co-opera-
tive corporateness of the Race as a whole. Only then will we
have developed a really authentic democratic way of life, for
only then will we have achieved a spiritual democracy in which
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